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The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal
Protocol: A Prototype for Financial
Mechanisms in Protecting the
Global Environment
Introduction
Environmental problems have reached levels critical enough to capture
the attention of the international political community in recent years.
Many states, as well as international organizations, have acknowledged
these problems as crises, and have recognized the necessity to confront
them.1 That governments have reached this conclusion, however, rep-
resents only a partial victory for the global environment. While the
symptoms have been diagnosed, there has been limited acknowledge-
ment of the cause and little progress towards a cure. Actual solutions, in
most instances, have yet to be developed and implemented. Moreover,
several difficulties exist in reaching solutions. Industrial countries reject
implications of liability and wrongdoing for past acts within their bor-
ders; less developed countries (LDCs) reject threats to their sovereignty
in the form of future regulations. Regardless, consequences will be suf-
fered by both industrial countries and LDCs indiscriminately. 2 Further-
more, as LDCs seek to industrialize with the least costly means available,
they will bear a significantly greater proportion of the financial burden
in using alternatives to conventional technologies, energy sources and
products.3
Measures to curb the depletion of the ozone layer provide a solu-
tion that appears both workable and equitable. The foundation of the
1. See, e.g., Economic Declaration of the G-7 London Summit, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA)
para. 52 (July 26, 1991), (available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File); Resolution on
Development and International Economic Cooperation: Environment, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm.,
44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. Doc. A/C-2/44/L.86 (1989) (resolution to con-
vene a U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in 1992).
2. See, e.g., Guinther Handl, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World
Countries: Common Destiny-Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 603 (1988)
[hereinafter Handl, Environmental Protection]. See also WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVI-
RONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 49 (1987) [hereinafter BRUND-
TLAND REPORT] (report of the WCED, chaired by Gro Harmen Brundtland, on special
request by the Secretary-General of the U.N.).
3. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 49. See also Guinther Handl, International
Efforts to Protect the Global Atmosphere: A Case of Too Little, Too Late?, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L.
250, 253 [hereinafter Handl, International Efforts].
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solution was established with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer ("Montreal Protocol"), 4 which regulates the
production and consumption of several chemicals that destroy the ozone
layer. Despite acknowledging the special needs of LDCs, the Montreal
Protocol did not provide a specific financial mechanism for alleviating
the economic burden of these countries in complying with the regula-
tions. In 1990, however, the parties to the Montreal Protocol recon-
vened to strengthen the regulations and to crystallize the financial
mechanism to effectuate these regulations. 5
The financial mechanism consists of a Multilateral Fund ("Fund"),
capitalized by contributions from industrial countries, to provide dis-
bursements to LDCs for the development and purchase of ozone-safe
technology and products. As the first multilateral fund established for
environmental protection, the Fund provides a hopeful-albeit contro-
versial-precedent for resolving the political issue of equity and the eco-
nomic issue of cost between industrial countries and LDCs. Without
radically restructuring international political, legal, and economic struc-
tures, the Fund attempts to balance the need for environmental protec-
tion with the need for some form of capital reallocation. It implicitly
recognizes that economic development can no longer occur indepen-
dently of environmental protection, and that neither can occur without
some reallocation of capital to LDCs, whether in the form of cash, tech-
nology, equipment, products, or expertise.6 While states may decide to
finance such reallocation, however, the capital to be transferred is
almost entirely controlled by private industry.7 Therefore, without
cooperation between the public and private sectors of industrial coun-
tries, the efficacy of the Fund will be severely limited.
This Note analyzes the Multilateral Fund as both a specific financial
mechanism for curbing the depletion of the ozone layer and as a proto-
type for financial mechanisms that can be used to curb other environ-
mental problems. Part I of the Note briefly discusses recent data
4. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for sig-
nature September 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan-
uary 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
5. Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (June 29, 1990) [hereinafter
Report of the Second Meeting].
The negotiations, held June 27-29, 1990, constituted the Second Meeting of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol. During this meeting, the parties adopted Adjust-
ments to the control measures of Article 2 and amendments to other articles. The
amendments are packaged as a single Amendment, to be ratified by twenty parties to
the Protocol before entering into force. As of December 31, 1991, fifteen countries
and the EC have ratified the Amendment. For purposes of this Note, the Adjust-
ments and Amendment to the Montreal Protocol are collectively termed the
"London Revisions."
6. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 68. "Growth in many developing coun-
tries also requires external capital inflows. Without reasonable flows, the prospect
for any improvements in living standards is bleak. As a result, the poor will be forced
to overuse the environment to ensure their own survival." Id.
7. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
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concerning the extent of ozone depletion and its effect on the global
environment. Part II discusses the political reaction to depletion of the
ozone layer and the provisions of the Montreal Protocol. This section
also describes the weaknesses of the Montreal Protocol and the subse-
quent adjustments and amendments established in 1990. Part III ana-
lyzes the structure and implementation of the Fund. Part IV critiques
the Fund and its ability to meet the concomitant needs of environmental
protection and economic development. The Note concludes with an
assessment of such financial mechanisms as a means of confronting
ozone depletion and other environmental crises.
I. The Threat of Ozone Depletion
The stratospheric ozone layer protects the earth from the harmful ultra-
violet radiation of the sun.8 The depletion of the ozone layer was first
hypothesized in 1974,9 but the seriousness of the threat in terms of the
time and magnitude of depletion has been confirmed only in the last six
years. 10 Since then, scientific evidence has mounted considerably, and
8. There is an extensive bibliography on the scientific processes and issues con-
cerning the ozone layer and ozone depletion. See generally WORLD METEOROLOGICAL
ORGANIZATION, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE: 1989 (Global
Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, Report No. 20)(1989) [hereinafter SCIEN-
TIFIC ASSESSMENT OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE]; F. Sherwood Rowland, Stratospheric
Ozone Depletion by Chlorofluorocarbons, 19 AMBIO 281 (1990); JACK FISHMAN & ROBERT
KALISH, GLOBAL ALERT: THE OZONE POLLUTION CRISIS (1990).
The stratospheric ozone layer extends from 12 to 24 miles above the surface of the
earth. It consists mostly of diatomic oxygen molecules, 02, which break up and
recombine to form ozone, Os, when they are exposed to high-energy ultraviolet radi-
ation from the sun (UV-C radiation). In turn, when ozone is exposed to the sun's
radiation, it breaks down into diatomic oxygen, so that the cycle remains in equilib-
rium. Because of its instability, ozone absorbs energy from a slightly lower-energy
ultraviolet range of the electromagnetic spectrum (UV-B radiation). By absorbing
UV-B in the stratosphere, ozone acts as a screen, preventing that radiation from
reaching the earth's surface. FISHMAN & KALISH, supra, at 33-42
9. See Mario J. Molina & F. S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes:
Chlorine Atom-Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974); Richard Stolarski
& Ralph J. Cicerone, Stratospheric Chlorine: A Possible Sink for Chlorine, 52 CAN. J. CHEM.
1610 (1974). These two studies demonstrated that chlorine atoms in the strato-
sphere could have a significant effect on the natural formation of ozone.
The former study indicated that anthropogenic chlorofluorocarbon molecules
(CFCs) provide a source of free chlorine atoms in the stratosphere. These atoms
would then react with ozone. Molina & Roland, supra, at 810.
The latter study demonstrated that a chlorine atom would react with the unstable
ozone molecule, resulting in two diatomic oxygen molecules and a single chlorine
atom (CI + O = 010 + 02; C10 + 0 = CI + 02). The chlorine atom would then
be free to react with another ozone molecule. Stolarski & Cicerone, supra, at 1610.
This cyclical process is termed the "catalytic cycle of ozone destruction." One
chlorine atom can react with ozone 10,000 to 100,000 times before it will react with
something else and break the cycle. See FISHMAN & KALISH, supra note 8, at 43.
10. SHARON ROAN, OZONE CRISIS 125-41 (1989).
From 1974 to 1985, studies of ozone depletion caused by CFCs were refuted by
industry researchers and largely ignored by politicians. The one exception con-
cerned nonessential uses of CFCs, such as aerosols, which were completely phased
out pursuant to regulations issued in May 1977 by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer Products Safety
Cornell International Law Journal
the scientific community has spoken of the threat of ozone depletion
with virtual unanimity, although quantitative data is still lacking. 1
A. Cause of Ozone Depletion
While there is no direct proof that ozone depletion is caused by
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the causal relationship is no longer ques-
tioned. Ozone depletion is caused by three interrelated factors: the
steady increase in anthropogenic CFCs, 12 which are released into the
atmosphere through industrial use and waste;15 the photolysis of these
CFCs in the stratosphere, which releases free chlorine atoms; and the
reaction of free chlorine atoms with ozone.14
CFCs are virtually the sole source of chlorine in the stratosphere. 15
Commission. However, nonaerosol uses of CFCs increased while scientists could not
reach consensus as to the timeframe or magnitude of potential stratospheric ozone
depletion. See generally Sylvia M. Williams, A Historical Background on the Chlorofluoro-
carbon Ozone Depletion Theory and Its Legal Implications, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLU-
TION: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE COOPERATION OF STATES 267, 270 (Cees
Flinterman, Barbara Kwiatkowska, Johan G. Lammers eds. 1986) [hereinafter TRANS-
BOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION].
In 1985, the British Antarctic Survey published results of their studies, which
showed a 40% decrease in stratospheric ozone above the Antarctic during the end of
the austral winter in September and October. SeeJ. C. Farman, B. G. Gardiner &J.
0. Shanklin, Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal Seasonal ClO.NOx Interaction,
315 NATURE 207 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Susan Solomon, Progress Towards a Quantitative Understanding of
Antarctic Ozone Depletion, 347 NATURE 347, 350, 352 (1990).
12. CFCs derive their ubiquity in industry from their chemical characteristics
(they are extremely stable, nontoxic, inert compounds) and from their economic
characteristics (they are simple and cheap to manufacture). See generally ROSEMARY F.
BRADLEY ET AL., CEH MARKETING RESEARCH REPORT: FLUOROCARBONS (1990).
CFCs have many applications: over 40% of the CFCs produced are used as cool-
ants for refrigerators and air conditioners (CFC-12 and CFC-22); 22% are used as
blowing agents in the production of plastic foam products (CFC-1 1); 15% are used as
solvents in the electronics and optics industries (CFC-1 13). Id. at 543.7001 O-W.
The cost of manufacturing CFCs is relatively small. CFC-11, CFC-12 and CFC-113
have selling prices of 0.60, 0.71, 0.92 dollars/pound, respectively, while the cost of
production is 0.43, 0.64, 0.64 dollars/pound, respectively. Id. at 543.7000 W.
13. FISHMAN & KALISH, supra note 8, at 44-45. The presence of CFCs in the
atmosphere is directly proportional to their anthropogenic production. See Solomon,
supra note 11, at 347.
14. J. G. Anderson et al., Free Radicals Within the Antarctic Vortex: The Role of CFCs in
Antarctic Ozone Loss, 251 SCIENCE 39, 45 (1991).
When taken independently, each element in the case contains a segment of
the puzzle that in itself is not conclusive. When taken together, however,
they provide convincing evidence that the dramatic reduction in column-inte-
grated 03 over the Antarctic continent would not have occurred had CFCs
not been synthesized and then added to the atmosphere.
Id.
15. FISHMAN & KALISH, supra note 8, at 44-45. Natural chlorine exists in the strat-
osphere at levels of approximately 0.6 parts per billion (ppbv). However, by the early
1980s, levels of chlorine approached 2.5 ppbv. Solomon, supra note 11, at 347.
While CFC-12 concentration in the stratosphere has increased from 200 parts per
trillion (pptv) in 1975 to 400 pptv in 1987, chlorine concentration in the stratosphere
has increased by a factor of two to three during this time. FISHMAN & KALISH, supra
note 8, at 44-45.
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These chlorine atoms react with and break down ozone molecules,
although the mechanics of this reaction are not fully understood.1 6 As
the concentration of chlorine in the atmosphere has increased, ozone
levels have decreased proportionately. 17 While ozone levels fluctuate
annually, "CFC concentrations have now increased enough to ensure
the near total destruction of ozone in the lower stratosphere in most
years." 1 8 Furthermore, the "longevity of CFCs in the atmosphere
would guarantee that such extreme holes would be around for much of
the next century."1 9
In addition to CFCs, halons are a major factor in the destruction of
ozone molecules. 20 These chemicals contain bromine atoms, which act
similarly to chlorine upon reaching the stratosphere.21 Although halons
are not as prevalent as CFCs, they are more destructive to the ozone
layer.22
B. Effects of Ozone Depletion
Ozone depletion increases the UV-B radiation reaching the earth's sur-
face. 23 This increase harms both human health and environmental eco-
systems. The specific effects of this increase range from increased
incidence of skin cancer and eye cataracts in humans to complete disrup-
tions of aquatic food chains, which are supported by phytoplankton
acutely sensitive to UV light.2 4
16. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 14, at 39-40. There are generally four
possible mechanisms by which chlorine might react with ozone. All begin with free
chlorine atoms and chlorine monoxide, but one theory places an emphasis on free
bromine atoms which magnify the effect (in that bromine acts similarly to chlorine),
and another theory emphasizes nitrogen as one of the catalyzing elements. Id. See
also Solomon, supra note 11, at 348-49.
17. Solomon, supra note 11, at 47.
18. Richard A. Kerr, Another Deep Antarctic Ozone Hole, 250 SCIENCE 370 (1990)
(paraphrasing Mark Schoeberl of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center).
19. Id.
20. MichaelJ. Prather & Robert T. Watson, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion and Future
Levels of Atmospheric Chlorine and Bromine, 344 NATURE 729 (1990).
21. Solomon, supra note 11, at 349.
22. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7003 F. Halons are used only as agents
for fire extinguishers. Id. The destructiveness to the ozone layer of compounds is
measured in terms of its Ozone Depletion Potential (ODP). CFC-11 and CFC-12
have ODPs of 1.0, and other CFCs are slightly lower, ranging from 0.4 to 0.8. Halon
1301 has an ODP ranging from 7.8 to 13.2, while other halons have ODPs varying
from 2.2 to 6.2. By comparison, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), which contain
a hydrogen atom in place of a chlorine atom, have ODPs ranging from 0.0 13 to 0.11.
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, supra note 8, at xiii, 424-51.
23. JuTrA BRUNNEE, ACID RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND REGULATION 43 (1988).
24. Taylor Moore, Concern Over Ozone, E.P.R.I.J.,June 1989, at 15-16. See generally
Joe Farman, What Hope for the Ozone Layer Now?, 116 NEW SCIENTIST, November 12,
1987, at 50, 54; Medwin M. Mintzis, Skin Cancer: The Price for a Depleted Ozone Layer, 12
E.P.A. J. 7 (1986); Stratospheric Ozone Depletion and Chlorofluorocarbons: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Protection, Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances, of
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [herein-
after Joint Hearings on Ozone Depletion].
Cornell International Law Journal
The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that a one per-
cent decrease in stratospheric ozone may lead to a two percent increase
in the incidence of non-melanoma skin cancer among fair-skinned peo-
ple.25 Until recently, estimates predicted 142,000 new cases of skin can-
cer by 2025 due to a two percent loss of ozone. 26 In April 1991,
however, the EPA released the results of a satellite study that estimated
ozone loss as five percent per decade, which may cause 200,000 skin-
cancer deaths by 2050.27 In addition to increasing the incidence of cata-
racts, UV-B exposure affects the human immune response system. 28
In terms of environmental effects, no in situ studies have conclu-
sively shown that ozone depletion has affected Antarctic plant or animal
life,29 but laboratory tests conclude that UV radiation severely damages
the DNA of several species of plankton, 30 the base of the Antarctic
marine food chain. Terrestrial plants exposed to UV-B radiation in the
25. Moore, supra note 24, at 17.
A study in Australia has computed related statistics, in which a 10.5%o decrease in
ozone had resulted in a 21% increase in effective UV-B irradiance. Colin R. Roy et
al., Ozone Depletion, 347 NATURE 235, 236 (1990).
The Environmental Effects Panel, established pursuant to Article 6 of the Montreal
Protocol, released the Executive Summary of its Report in November 1991. It stated
that "[riecent information on the relationship of non-melanoma skin cancer to UV
exposures confirms previous findings.... It is now predicted that a sustained 10%
decrease in ozone will be associated with a 26% increase in non-melanoma skin can-
cer." UNEP, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS PANEL REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii (1991)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS PANEL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].
26. BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 44 (citing D. J. Dudek & M. Oppenheimer, The
Implications of Health and Environmental Effects for Policy, in I EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE J. Titus ed. 1986)(an EPA and UNEP
study)).
27. John Carey, A Red Alert Over the Ozone, BUSINESSWEEK, April 22, 1991, at 88.
28. BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 44.
The Environmental Effects Panel concluded that "[t]he induction of immunosup-
pression by UV-B has now been demonstrated in humans, not only those of light
pigmentation, but also deeply pigmented individuals. This places all of the world's
populations at risk of the potential adverse impacts of UV-B on the immune system."
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS PANEL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 25, at iii.
Adverse ocular effects also "appear to be independent of pigmentation .... It is
now predicted that, all other things being equal, a sustained 10% decrease in ozone
will be associated with between 1.6 and 1.75 million additional cases of cataract per
year world-wide." Id.
29. Moore, supra note 24, at 17. See also Deneb Karentz, Ecological Considerations of
Antarctic Ozone Depletion, 3 ANTARCTIC SCIENCE 3 (1991).
The extent of ecosystem modification that has already taken place or that may
be caused by future ozone depletion events is not known. There are certain
physical features of the Antarctic environment (clouds, snow, ice, etc.) that
may modify UV-B exposure, so that incident intensities and inwater transmis-
sion may not be accurately assessed from atmospheric models. In addition,
little is known about the UV-B photobiology of endemic species. Organisms
may have repair processes and protective mechanisms that can alter biologi-
cal effects.
Id. at 3.
30. Richard Monastersky, UV Damages Base of Antarctic Food Web, 138 SCIENCE
NEws 87 (1990).
Vol 25
1992 Multilateral Fund of Montreal Protocol
laboratory have also suffered negative effects,3 1 although little is known
about effects in situ.3 2
C. Extent of Ozone Depletion
Precipitous ozone depletion has been recorded over both poles, while
the mid-latitudes have experienced significant loss. Ozone loss, amount-
ing to as much as seventy-five percent, 33 has been reported in a limited
area over Antarctica following the austral winter. 34 This phenomenon,
termed the "ozone hole," is a seasonal event resulting from complicated
meteorological conditions, including stratospheric cloud formation and
temperature.3 5 While fluctuations occur naturally, extreme ozone
depletion has occurred during three of the last four years.3 6 The hole
recorded in 1987 surpassed predictions, but with similar measurements
in 1989 and 1990, such depletion now appears to be the norm.3 7 Dur-
ing 1987, 1989, and 1990, virtually all the ozone normally occurring in
31. Joint Hearings on Ozone Depletion, supra note 24, at 48. Over two-thirds of all
plants tested demonstrate some sensitivity to UV radiation. See also Ved P. Nanda,
Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A Challenge for International Environmental Law and Policy, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 482, 490 [hereinafter Nanda, Ozone Depletion].
32. BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 44-45.
See also ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS PANEL ExEcurIVE SUMMARY, supra note 25, at iv.
"Certain environmental factors, both biotic (e.g., plant diseases and competition with
other plants) and abiotic (e.g., carbon dioxide, temperature, heavy metals, and water
availability), can interact with the effect of UV-B radiation in plants. This makes it
difficult to make qualitative predictions." Id.
33. Roy et al., supra note 25, at 235.
34. Solomon, supra note 11, at 348. The ozone hole appears in September, but is
"then filled in to a substantial degree by the rapid influx of ozone-rich air from lower
latitudes that accompanies the dynamical breakdown of the winter polar stratospheric
vortex." Id. See also Roy et al., supra note 25, at 235.
35. See, e.g., Mark R. Schoeberl & Dennis L. Hartmann, The Dynamics of the Strato-
spheric Polar Vortex and Its Relation to Springtime Ozone Depletions, 251 SCIENCE 46 (1991);
Solomon, supra note 11, at 347-48. See also Martyn Chipperfield, Stratospheric Ozone
Depletion Over the Arctic, 349 NATURE 279 (1991).
The polar vortex is a column of air formed during winter at each pole, causing
atmospheric temperatures to fall. Lower temperatures in turn allow polar strato-
spheric clouds to form, the ice particles of which serve as a surface on which CFCs
can break down into chlorine and chlorine monoxide. When the clouds dissipate at
the end of the winter, the increased sunlight provides the energy for the chlorine-
ozone reaction. Chipperfield, supra, at 279-80.
36. Kerr, supra note 18, at 370. More importantly, ozone depletion in the last two
years has been extreme despite weather conditions that favored a shallow hole. Id.
37. Id. Ozone concentration is monitored via satellite by the Total Ozone Map-
ping Spectrometer (TOMS). Normal ozone concentration over Antarctica is 220
Dobson units. The 1987 hole was 121 Dobson units, and the 1989 and 1990 holes
were 124 and 125 Dobson units, respectively. The 1988 hole was relatively small. Id.
See also UNEP, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT PANEL REPORT ExEcUrIVE SUMMARY (1991)
(prepared by the Scientific Assessment Panel pursuant to Article 6 of the Montreal
Protocol, released in October 1991) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC PANEL REPORT ExEcU-
TIVE SUMMARY]. "Strong Antarctic ozone holes have continued to occur and, in four
of the past five years, have been deep and extensive in area. This contrasts to the
situation in the mid-1980s, where the depth and area of the ozone hole exhibited a
quasi-biennial modulation. Large increases in surface ultraviolet radiation have been
observed in Antarctica during periods of low ozone." Id. at 1.
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the stratospheric-cloud layer at altitudes of 15-23 kilometers was
destroyed.3 8 Satellite data indicate that the ozone hole is affecting
ozone concentration throughout most of the Southern Hemisphere,3 9
and between 1979 and 1989, ozone concentration over the fifty-degree
latitude decreased between three and eight percent.40
A similar, although smaller, ozone hole has appeared over the Arc-
tic pole during late winter and early spring.4 1 In addition to the hole
over the Arctic, "a gradual long-term downward trend has been
reported at the northern mid-latitudes."'4 2 In April 1991, the EPA
released a study that reported ozone loss over the northern mid-lati-
tudes (the area between Seattle and New Orleans) twice as great as pre-
viously estimated.43 This loss may be generally four to five percent per
decade, while during winter months it can be as high as eight percent. 44
L1. International Political Reaction to the Threat of Ozone Depletion
The international response to the threat of ozone depletion was initially
tentative.45 The first major multilateral agreement on the issue, the
38. Id.
39. Solomon, supra note 11, at 353. Upon the breakup of the polar vortex and the
influx of ozone-rich air from higher latitudes, ozone-depleted air moves from the
polar region to the higher latitudes. Id.
See also Roy et al., supra note 25, at 236 (noting that there was a 10.5% decrease in
ozone concentration during December 1987 in parts of Australia).
40. Solomon, supra note 11, at 353.
41. Id. See also M. H. Proffitt et al., Ozone Loss in the Arctic Polar Vortex Inferred From
High-Altitude Aircraft Measurements, 347 NATURE 31 (1990); Chipperfield, supra note 35,
at 279. The smaller size of the Arctic hole may be attributed to warmer temperatures
and a smaller polar vortex, which inhibits the formation of polar stratospheric clouds.
Schoeberl & Hartmann, supra note 35, at 47.
One group of researchers argues that ozone loss in the Arctic has been underesti-
mated. Proffitt et al., supra, at 36. But see Alan Plumb, Ozone Depletion in the Arctic, 347
NATURE 20 (1990) (questioning the assumptions made by Proffitt and colleagues in
their research).
42. Chipperfield, supra note 35, at 279.
43. Richard A. Kerr, Ozone Destruction Worsens, 252 SCIENCE 204 (1991).
44. Id.
See also SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT PANEL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 37,
at 1. "Ground-based and satellite observations continue to show decreases of total
column ozone in winter in the northern hemisphere. For the first time, there is evi-
dence of significant decreases in spring and summer in both northern and southern
hemispheres at middle and high latitudes, as well as in the southern winter." Id.
(emphasis in original).
45. See generally Iwona Rummel-Bulska, The Protection of the Ozone Layer Under the
Global Framework Convention, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION, supra note 10, at 281-
285; RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 40-44 (1991).
The first international action was the establishment of the Coordinating Commit-
tee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL) and the adoption of the World Plan of Action on the
Ozone Layer in 1977. The CCOL consisted of representatives of states, international
organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The World Plan of Action called
for research on the ozone layer. Between 1980 and 1984, several ad hoc committees
were established under the impetus of UNEP to conduct research and to develop a
global framework for protection of the ozone layer. Rummel-Bulska, supra, at 281-
83.
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Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer ("Vienna
Convention"), 4 6 called for all states to assume responsibility for protect-
ing the ozone layer,47 but it neither defined this responsibility nor regu-
lated CFC production.48 The Vienna Convention did, however, create a
framework and identify a core of states that would take primary respon-
sibility for drafting an agreement actually limiting CFC production and
consumption. 49
This subsequent agreement, the Montreal Protocol, not only pro-
vided for a body of regulations to address the problem of ozone deple-
tion but also sought to allocate the costs of such regulation equitably
between industrial countries and less developed countries. 50 These two
goals conflicted with each other in many ways, and consequently the
Montreal Protocol was criticized for compromising both of them: it
neither placed sufficient restrictions on CFC production and consump-
tion adequate to protect the ozone layer, nor did it provide compensa-
tory measures sufficient to assist LDCs meet the increased costs of
substitutes.5 1 Consequently, the Montreal Protocol was amended in
1990 in order to strengthen the regulations and to develop a financial
mechanism for the needed assistance. Section A of Part II will discuss
the Montreal Protocol as drafted originally; Section B will discuss the
revisions made in 1990.
A. The Montreal Protocol
Forty-five states and the European Community originally signed the
46. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature,
March 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) (entered into
force September 22, 1988) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
There were 43 participants in the negotiations. As of December 31, 1991, 80
states and the EC had ratified it. Status of Ratification/Accession/Acceptance/Approval of
the Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol and Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, UNEP,
Dec. 1991 (Eighth Issue) U.N. Doc. 4476L Ratifica [hereinafter Status of Ratification].
47. Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 2, para. 1.
48. The Vienna Convention called for a series of workshops to study ozone
depletion in a nonpolitical context, and to monitor and exchange information. Id.
49. The Vienna Convention was accompanied by a Resolution on a Protocol Con-
cerning Chlorofluorocarbons, which discussed the future intention of the parties to
establish a protocol. See BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 229, 236.
For a general discussion on the history of the political response to ozone deple-
tion, see BENEDICK, supra note 45, and Peter M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy
Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793 (1989).
50. This Note provides only an overview of the Montreal Protocol, with emphasis
placed on the provisions concerning LDCs. Many sources examine various aspects of
the Montreal Protocol. For a general analysis see BENEDICK, supra note 45, at 74-106;
Nanda, Ozone Depletion, supra note 31; James T. B. Tripp, The UNEP Montreal Protocol
Industrialized and Developing Countries Sharing the Responsibility for Protecting the Strato-
spheric Ozone Layer, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 733 (1988); and BRUNNEE, supra note
23, at 236-53.
51. See Nanda, Ozone Depletion, supra note 31, at 511, 515; Handl, International
Efforts, supra note 3, at 253.
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Montreal Protocol, 52 and prior to the Second Meeting of the Parties in
1990, fifty-three states had ratified it.25 The Montreal Protocol called
for a fifty percent reduction in the production and consumption of CFCs
by 1999, 54 with special allowances for certain LDCs.5 5 To remove
incentives not to join, it restricted trade of ozone-depleting substances
with nonparties.5 6 Article 9 of the Montreal Protocol also provided for
collaborative research, development and exchange of information on
new technologies for containing or destroying controlled substances
and for developing ozone-safe alternatives. 57 In recognition of the need
to distribute equitably the costs involved with the control of CFCs and
development of substitutes, Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol called
for technical assistance to LDCs. 58 The signatories also adopted a Reso-
lution on the Exchange of Technical Information to accompany the
Montreal Protocol.5 9 Although nonobligatory in nature, this resolution
emphasized that an exchange of information on technologies is neces-
sary to effect the goals of the Montreal Protocol. Despite this language,
Articles 9 and 10 did not establish a specific mechanism for implement-
ing this exchange.
1. Control Measures for Ozone-Depleting Substances
The Montreal Protocol seeks to decrease worldwide use of ozone-
depleting substances and increase the use of ozone-safe substitutes. It
requires all parties to meet incremental percentage reductions in their
production and consumption of CFCs.60 The reductions are based on
each country's calculated level of production and consumption for 1986.
The Montreal Protocol also called for a freeze on the production and
52. Status of Ratification, supra note 46, at 12. States that had signed but had not
ratified the Montreal Protocol as of November 31, 1991 were Congo, Indonesia,
Israel, Morocco and Senegal. Id.
53. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7000 K.
54. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2.
55. Id. art. 5.
56. Id. art. 4.
57. Id. art. 9.
58. Id. art. 10.
59. Resolution on the Exchange of Technical Information, reprinted in 26 I.L.M.
1548 (1987).
The Resolution specifically calls on the Executive Director of UNEP "to make
appropriate arrangements to facilitate the exchange of information on technology
referred to in Articles 9 and 10." It also calls on all interested states and non-govern-
ment organizations "to sponsor a workshop with the aim of exchang[ing] information
on technologies." Id.
60. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2, paras. 1, 3, 4.
BeginningJuly 1, 1989, all parties except Article 5 countries, see infra note 65, must
freeze CFC production and consumption at 1986 levels; beginning July 1, 1990,
there must be a 10% reduction from 1986 levels; beginning July 1, 1993, a 20%
reduction; beginningJuly 1, 1998, a 50% reduction. Id.
For both "the basic domestic needs" of Article 5 countries and industrial rationali-
zation, the following allowances are provided: beginning 1990, a 10%o increase in
production over 1986 levels; beginning 1993, a 10% reduction in production from
1986 levels; beginning 1998, a 35% reduction in production from 1986 levels. Id.
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consumption of several types of halons by 1992.61 CFCs and halons,
subject to different restrictions, are classified as Group I and Group II
respectively, and collectively known as "controlled substances."
The Montreal Protocol was criticized for not requiring greater
reductions in CFC and halon production and consumption. 6 2 The fifty
percent reduction was expected merely to retard destruction of the
ozone layer rather than to prevent completely any further deteriora-
tion. 63 Furthermore, the fifty percent reduction represented the maxi-
mum achievable reduction, conditioned on LDCs neither delaying their
compliance by ten years nor increasing their production, both allowed
under Article 5. A more realistic scenario contemplated a thirty-five
percent cut in CFC production by 1999. 64
2. Assistance to Less Developed Countries
The Montreal Protocol assists LDCs in several ways. Pursuant to Article
5, control provisions and reduction requirements are significantly less
stringent for LDCs than for other countries. Before an LDC can qualify
for any favorable status, however, it must have an "annual calculated
level of consumption of the controlled substances ... less than 0.3 kilo-
grams per capita."6 5 Most significantly, an Article 5 country benefits
from a ten-year delay in complying with the reduction percentages. 66
Furthermore, the reduction percentages are not as great as those for
other parties. 67 Lastly, if an Article 5 country postpones compliance for
ten years, it can increase its level of consumption and production of con-
trolled substances during that time up to 0.3 kilograms per capita. The
LDC can then use "either the average of its annual calculated level of
consumption for the period 1995 to 1997 inclusive or a calculated level
of consumption of 0.3 kilograms per capita, whichever is lower,"' 68 as its
61. Id. art. 2, para. 2. Three types of halons are regulated by the Montreal Proto-
col, and are classified as Group II. Id.
62. See, e.g., Robert C. Cowen, Ozone Impact: Obsolete Before It Starts?, CHRISTIAN
SCL MONrrOR, Dec. 30, 1988, at 3; Tripp, supra note 50, at 739-41; Nanda, Ozone
Depletion, supra note 31, at 503-04, 510-13; David D. Doniger, Global Emergency, ENvrL.
FORUM, July/Aug., 1988, at 14.
63. Tripp, supra note 50, at 740.
64. Id.
65. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1.
For a country to qualify for special treatment under Article 5, it must meet both the
consumption requirement and the definition of "developing country." The Montreal
Protocol does not define the criteria to be used in determining whether a country is
"developing," but relies on the classifications of the World Bank, UNDP, and the
OECD. At the Third Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol ("Third Meet-
ing of the Parties"), the parties requested that the Open-Ended Working Group pre-
pare a report on the issue for the next meeting. Report of the Third Meeting of the Parties
to the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.3/1l (June 21, 1991) [hereinafter
Report of the Third Meeting].
LDCs that qualify for preferred treatment are termed either "Article 5 countries"
or "qualified LDCs."
66. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1.
67. See supra note 60.
68. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1.
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base figure for determining the percentage reductions. It does not need
to use 1986 as the base year. The Montreal Protocol stipulates that a
developing country may take advantage of these allowances in order to
meet its "basic domestic needs," but it leaves the term undefined. 69
Aside from these relaxed control measures, Article 5 countries
receive two forms of assistance directly from other parties. Economic
assistance, a general "industrial rationalization," 70 is available to all par-
ties, including Article 5 countries. 7 1 Technical assistance applies specifi-
cally to Article 5 countries. The preamble of the Montreal Protocol
"acknowledge[s] that special provision is required to meet the needs of
developing countries" 7 2 and technical assistance was therefore provided
under Article 10 "to facilitate participation in and implementation of the
Protocol."7 3
The Montreal Protocol as originally drafted did not specify the
means or degree of such assistance. This omission undermined the obli-
gatory language in Article 10. In addition to technical assistance, Article
9 sought cooperation in promoting research and the exchange of infor-
mation on technology. Again, no specific means or degree was pro-
vided.74 This Article was further limited in that cooperation was
obligatory only insofar as it was "consistent with national laws, regula-
tions and practices." Thus, domestic law as well as economic, financial,
and political policies-even a nonlegal "practice"-could trump inter-
national efforts at cooperation.
69. Id. art. 5, para. 1. See Paul Tourangeau, Note, Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Can It Keep Us All From Needing Hats, Sunglasses, and Suntan
Lotion?, 11 IHASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 509, 525 (1988).
70. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2, paras. 1-5.
71. The Montreal Protocol allows for any party to transfer some or all of its pro-
duction level to another party "for the purpose of achieving economic efficiencies."
Id. art. 1, para. 8. To illustrate, "if one party does not use all of its controlled-sub-
stances production allotment, that party may sell its rights to produce the controlled
substances to another party which may have already reached its production level...
and which wants to produce more." Nanda, Ozone Depletion, supra note 31, at 503-5.
Such production increase, however, cannot exceed 10 percent of the required control
measures, and it applies only to production of CFCs covered in the original Protocol;
it is not available for the other CFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride or methyl chloro-
form. See Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex I (arts. 2A-2E).
While these provisions are intended for general economic efficiency, they thwart
the overarching goal of reducing CFC production. Furthermore, they are not
designed specifically for the benefit of LDCs, but for all parties. In light of this, the
marginal economic justification does not justify the marginal cost to environmental
protection.
72. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, preamble, para. 7.
73. Id. art. 10, para. 1. Article 10, paragraph 1, states in its entirety: "The Parties
shall, in the context of the provisions of Article 4 of the [Vienna] Convention, and
taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, cooperate in pro-
moting technical assistance to facilitate participation in and implementation of the
Protocol." Id.
74. Id. art. 9. "The Parties shall cooperate, consistent with their national laws,
regulations and practices and taking into account in particular the needs of develop-
ing countries, in promoting .. research, development and exchange of information
... on best technologies ... and possible alternatives." Id.
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Although the Montreal Protocol recognized the special needs of
LDCs and intended to distribute the costs of protecting the ozone layer
equitably, it failed to identify and quantify costs and their distribution
between industrial countries and LDCs. LDCs had no assurance that
they would receive any significant monetary or technological assistance
from industrial countries. As a result of such uncertainty, only twenty-
five of the Protocol's fifty-three parties were LDCs; 75 while this is almost
fifty percent, LDCs comprise seventy-eight percent of the countries
worldwide. 76 China and India originally refused to sign the Montreal
Protocol expressly because of this failure.7 7 While China and India con-
sume only two percent of the world's CFCs, they represent thirty-five
percent of the world's population. 78
This discrepancy between the language and the actual requirements
underscored the failings of the Montreal Protocol from the perspective
of LDCs on two levels. First, although LDCs-China and India in partic-
ular-currently consume an extremely small percentage of CFCs, they
have enormous potential consumption and the technical ability to pro-
duce CFCs.7 9 If these countries refused to become parties, the efficacy
of the Montreal Protocol in protecting the ozone layer would have been
severely undermined. Second, the Montreal Protocol, considered to be
the first concerted global initiative prospectively and equitably to con-
front a future environmental crisis, had important symbolic significance.
If neither China nor India ratified it, thirty-five percent of the world's
population would remain unrepresented and the vision of the Protocol
as a global initiative would wither away.
B. The London Revisions to the Montreal Protocol
The First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol was held in
June 1989, in Helsinki,8 0 and called for the complete elimination of
CFCs from production and consumption (excluding Article 5 countries)
by 2000. This was known as the "Helsinki Declaration." 8' The Helsinki
75. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7000 K.
76. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 164-65 (1989) [hereinafter
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1989]. Of a total 120 countries reporting data to the
World Bank, 95 are classified as low- or middle-income economies. Id.
77. Lynne Curry, The Environment: China's Ozone Debate Puts Holes in Montreal Proto-
col, FIN. TiMES, July 15, 1988, at 6 (stating that a representative of the Chinese
National Environmental Protection Agency had voiced concerns about the lack of
measures concerning technology transfer and the unequal treatment favoring devel-
oped nations); Indian Government Urged to Sign Montreal Protocol, Xinhua General Over-
seas News Service, July 10, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File) (reporting
statement by Indian Minister for Environment and Forests, Ms. Maneka Gandhi, that
India refused to sign because Protocol lacked provisions for technology transfer and
permanent fund).
78. Tripp, supra note 50, at 744.
79. See infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
80. See Report of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on the Work of Its First Meeting, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5 (1989) [hereinafter Report of the First Meeting].
81. Id. app. I (Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer)[hereinafter Helsinki Declaration].
Cornell International Law Journal
Declaration also sought to expand the list of regulated anthropogenic
chemicals and recognized that the major challenge facing the parties
concerned the transfer of financial resources and technology to LDCs.
At the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, one
year later in London, the parties effectuated the Helsinki Declaration
through formal adjustments and amendments to the Montreal Proto-
col. 82 In addition to strengthening the Protocol's ban on ozone-deplet-
ing substances, the London Revisions established a financial mechanism
to assist LDCs in bearing the costs of meeting this ban. The negotiating
efforts that led to the revisions were rewarded with the accession of
China to the Montreal Protocol in June 1991, and the expressed inten-
tion of India to accede in the near future.8 3 As of December 31, 1991,
73 states and the EC have ratified the Montreal Protocol while fifteen
states and the EC have ratified the Amendment to the Protocol.8 4
1. Control Measures for Ozone-Depleting Substances
The London Revisions alter the schedule of regulation for all parties by
allowing for an initial increase in CFC consumption and production, but
requiring a much faster subsequent reduction in these figures, and a
total ban by 2000.85 Halons will also be banned by 2000.86 Addition-
ally, the London Revisions provide regulations for several other fully
halogenated but previously unregulated CFCs, carbon tetrachloride,
and methyl chloroform. 87
82. See Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5.
For a general discussion of the London Revisions, see Dale S. Bryk, Note, The Mon-
treal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer, 15 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv.
275 (1991).
83. Report of the Third Meeting, supra note 65, at para. 28. Although India has not
yet ratified the Montreal Protocol, in March 1991, it ratified the Vienna Convention.
84. Status of Ratification, supra note 46, at 12, 16.
85. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex I, art. 2A, paras. 2-5. Begin-
ningJuly 1991, Parties shall not exceed 150% of their 1986 levels of CFC production
and consumption; beginning 1995, parties shall not exceed 50% of 1986 levels;
beginning 1997, parties shall not exceed 15% of 1986 levels; beginning 2000, pro-
duction and consumption shall be 0. Id.
Article 5 countries may allow production levels to exceed these limits by 10% until
2000, when they may exceed the limit by 15%. Id.
86. Id. annex I, art. 2B, paras. 1-3. The schedule requires a freeze of halons at
1986 levels by 1992, no more than 50% of 1986 levels by 1995, and 0% by 2000.
Article 5 countries may exceed these limits by 10% until 2000, when they can exceed
this limit by 15%. Id.
87. Id. annex II, arts. 2C, 2D, 2E.
Article 2C regulates other fully halogenated CFCs listed in Group I of Annex B.
Beginning 1993, calculated levels of consumption and production cannot exceed
80% of 1989 levels; beginning 1997, they cannot exceed 15% of 1989 levels; begin-
ning 2000, they cannot exceed 0%. Article 5 countries can exceed production limits
by 10% until 2000, when they can exceed the limit by 15%. Id.
Article 2D regulates carbon tetrachloride listed in Group II of Annex B. Beginning
1995, calculated levels of consumption and production cannot exceed 15% of 1989
levels; beginning 2000, they cannot exceed 0%. Article 5 countries can exceed these
production limits by 10% until 2000, when they can exceed the limit by 15%. Id.
Article 2E regulates methyl chloroform listed in Group III of Annex B. Beginning
1993, calculated levels of production and consumption cannot exceed 1989 levels;
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Although the amended Protocol features stricter control measures,
there is much concern that they are not sufficient. Thirteen states that
signed the amended Protocol issued a separate statement calling for a
total ban on all CFC production and consumption by 1997.88 Consider-
ation is also being given to the reduction or elimination of the ten-year
delay for Article 5 countries. While some groups had proposed a five-
year delay,89 pressure to eliminate the relaxed timetable has increased
sharply since the EPA findings released in April 1991.90 Thus far,
however, the delay under Article 5 appears inviolate to the parties
themselves.
2. Assistance to Less Developed Countries
The London Revisions cure many deficiencies of the Montreal Protocol
concerning equitable burden-sharing. In place of a previously ambigu-
ous promise of technical assistance, they establish specific guidelines for
a financial mechanism. 9 ' As amended, Article 10 establishes the finan-
cial mechanism with language that is direct, definite and obligatory.92
Most importantly, Article 10 now identifies the beneficiaries of the finan-
cial mechanism as those LDCs which qualify under Article 5 (developing
countries with an annual calculated consumption of less than 0.3 kilo-
grams per capita). The Montreal Protocol, in contrast, merely called for
beginning 1995, they cannot exceed 70% of 1989 levels; beginning 2000, they can-
not exceed 30% of 1989 levels; beginning 2005, they cannot exceed 0%. Article 5
countries can exceed production limits by 10% until 2005, when they can exceed the
limit by 15%. Id.
88. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, at 20. These states are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Id.
Article 2 of the Montreal Protocol as amended states that "[plarties may take more
stringent measures than those required by this Article and Articles 2A to 2E." Mon-
treal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 11.
89. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, FUNDING CHANGE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
MONTREAL PROTOCOL 23 (1990).
90. The parties, during the Third Meeting of the Parties, requested that: "the
Technology and Economic Assessment Panel evaluate, without prejudice to Article 5
of the Montreal Protocol, the implications, in particular for developing countries, of
the possibilities and difficulties of an earlier phase-out of the controlled substances,
for example the implications of a 1997 phase-out." Report of the Third Meeting, supra
note 65, para. 59 (decision III/12).
91. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex II, art. 10. The amended Arti-
cle states:
The Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes of providing finan-
cial and technical cooperation, including the transfer of technologies, to Par-
ties operating under paragraph I of Article 5 of this Protocol to enable their
compliance with the control measures ... of the Protocol. The mechanism,
contributions to which shall be additional to other financial transfers to Par-
ties operating under that paragraph, shall meet all agreed incremental costs
of such Parties in order to enable their compliance with the control measures
of the Protocol. An indicative list of the categories of incremental costs shall
be decided by the meeting of the Parties.
Id.
Cf. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 10 (quoted supra note 73).
92. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex II, art. 10.
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general technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries.93
Additionally, the London Revisions establish Article 1OA, which
provides for the transfer of "the best available, environmentally safe
substitutes and related technologies" to Article 5 countries from the
other parties.9 4 The transfers shall occur "under fair and most
favorable conditions."9 5 A modification of the preamble underscores
the importance of technology transfer and states that the parties will
"consider[] the importance of promoting international cooperation in
the research, development and transfer of alternate technologies relat-
ing to the control and reduction of emissions of substances that deplete
the ozone layer, bearing in mind, in particular, the needs of developing
countries." 9 6 Articles 10 and 1OA work in conjunction with one
another: the financial mechanism created in Article 10 makes available
to Article 5 countries the requisite capital to facilitate the transfer of
technology envisioned in Article 1OA.
The London Revisions link the financial mechanism and the availa-
bility of technology with the control measures of the amended Protocol.
This link is viewed as a causal one: LDCs will be able to comply with the
measures only if funding is adequate. The preamble, as amended,
"acknowledge[s] that special provision is required to meet needs of
developing countries, including the provision of additional financial
resources and access to relevant technologies." 9 7 Article 5 as amended
states that compliance of Article 5 countries will depend on the success
of the financial mechanism established under Article 10 and the technol-
ogy transfer under Article 10A.9 8 If an Article 5 country is unable to
comply with the Montreal Protocol due to "inadequate implementations
of Articles 10 and 10A," then the parties "shall consider the matter at
their next Meeting, giving due recognition to paragraph 5 of this Article
and shall decide upon appropriate action to be taken."9 9 No penalties
or noncompliance measures pursuant to Article 8 will be invoked
against an LDC that cannot comply for this reason.10 0
These provisions make industrial countries directly responsible for
the ability of LDCs to comply with the Protocol, since compliance is tied
to adequate funding and technology transfer. If LDCs determine that
the financial mechanism of Article 10 is not sufficient, they may request
additional resources to meet their needs. Because the Fund is currently
capitalized for only three years, these provisions assure LDCs of ade-
quate funding to assist them in meeting the costs of compliance.
93. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
94. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex II, art. 1 OA, subpara. (a).
95. Id. art. 10A, subpara. (b).
96. Id. annex II, preamble, para. 9.
97. Id. para. 7.
98. Id. annex II, art. 5, para. 5.
99. Id. art. 5, para. 6.
100. Id. art. 5, para. 7. LDCs will not be subject to noncompliance measures,
beginning from the time they notify the Secretariat of the Protocol of their inability
to comply, until the time the parties next meet. Id.
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The London Revisions recognize the inherent limitations in the
implementation of technology transfer. For example, Article 10A does
not establish specific requirements, but states that "each Party shall take
every practicable step ... to ensure [such transfer]." 101 However, the
technology to be transferred is largely developed and owned by private
industry, not by the states which are bound by the Montreal Protocol.'0 2
Moreover, there are no provisions governing the extent, the type or
manner in which such technologies are to be transferred from industrial
countries to LDCs.10 3 A further question concerns whether such an ini-
tiative should proceed on an international level, through multilateral or
bilateral treaties, or by means of national legislation within the domestic
arena of individual countries. This uncertainty under Article 1 OA is miti-
gated, however, by the establishment of the Fund under Article 10
because the Fund will defray the costs of these transfers when they
occur, and will finance compliance with the control measures.104
M. The Multilateral Fund
The parties convened in London with the intention of both strengthen-
ing the control measures and increasing the number of parties to the
Montreal Protocol, particularly among LDCs.10 5 These countries
"required incentives to leap-frog the CFC phase in their industrial
development [and] the Parties were now ready to make provisions for
those incentives." '10 6 These incentives include a provision for technol-
ogy transfer and a financial mechanism in the form of a multilateral
fund.10
7
A. Financial Aspects of the Fund
The purpose of the Fund is to provide Article 5 countries with financial
and technical assistance, including the transfer of technologies, so that
they can comply with the control measures of the amended Montreal
Protocol.108
1. Disbursements
The Fund will finance three categories of costs. The first category
includes enumerated incremental costs of Article 5 countries, on a grant
101. Id. art. 10A.
102. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
105. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, para. 18. (introduction by the Execu-
tive Director of UNEP). "The Protocol must also be forward-looking. One hundred
States Members of the United Nations had still to become Parties, among them,
newly industrializing nations, two of which, in particular, represented over one third
of mankind." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. annex II, art. 10, para. 2. "The mechanism ... shall include a Multilateral
Fund. It may also include other means of multilateral, regional and bilateral cooper-
ation." Id.
108. See id. art. 10, para. 1.
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or concessional basis1 0 9 and according to criteria established by the par-
ties. The second category consists of clearinghouse functions to draft
country-specific studies and identify individual needs for cooperation; to
facilitate technical cooperation to meet these needs; to increase educa-
tional efforts through publishing information and through holding
workshops and training programs; and to facilitate other forms of coop-
eration on regional, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Finally, the Fund
will finance its own administrative costs.11 0
In attempting to identify the incremental costs that the Fund will
cover, the London Revisions simply define such costs by example.
Incremental costs that the Fund would typically cover can be incurred
through (1) the development of ozone-safe substitutes, (2) the use of
such substitutes as intermediate goods in manufacturing, and (3) the
containment and destruction of ozone-depleting substances.11 1 This list
is not exhaustive, however.
If incremental costs other than those mentioned ... are identified and
qualified, a decision as to whether they are to be met by the financial
mechanism shall be taken by the Executive Committee consistent with any
criteria decided by the Parties and elaborated in the guidelines of the
Executive Committee.1 12
In order for an Article 5 country to receive funding, it must com-
plete a report on the domestic effects of the phase-out. 1 5 This report
must include individual project proposals"1 4 listing anticipated incre-
109. Disbursements will generally be in the form of grants. Concessional loans will
be provided where the investment project has a payback period of less than two
years, and the implementing agency (UNEP, UNDP or the World Bank) has recom-
mended that action. See Draft Report of the Third Meeting of the Executive Committee of the
Interim Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, annex III, § V,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/18 (1991) [hereinafter Draft Report of the Third
Meeting of the Executive Committee].
110. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex II, art. 10, para. 3.
111. Id. annex IV, app. I, para. 2. (indicative list of categories of incremental
costs).
Incremental costs in the supply of substitutes include the conversion of existing
facilities, establishment of new production facilities and premature retirement of
facilities. Also included are the costs of patents and royalties, retraining personnel,
as well as capital costs, net operational costs, the cost of raw materials, and the cost of
importing substitutes. Id.
Incremental costs in the use of substitutes as an intermediate good in manufactur-
ing include converting existing equipment and facilities, patents and royalties,
retraining, research and development, as well as capital costs and operational costs.
Id.
Incremental costs in the end use of ozone-depleting substances include the prema-
ture modification or replacement of user equipment, the collection, management,
recycling and destruction of ozone-depleting substances, and technical assistance in
reducing consumption and emission of ozone-depleting substances. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Draft Report of the Third Meeting of the Executive Committee, supra note 109,
annex III, § 11 (1).
114. The study must contain, in addition to project proposals, statistics on the pro-
duction, importation, and consumption of CFCs in that country, descriptions of the
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mental costs as enumerated in the Report of the Second Meeting. 115
For evaluating these project 16 proposals, the parties established a set of
criteria that includes the cost-effectiveness of the proposed project in
light of the beneficiary's economic and industrial strategies, the accuracy
of accounting to avoid double-counting, the savings or benefits derived
from the proposed project, and the timeframe of the proposed
project.1 17
The Fund will also perform clearinghouse functions, such as distrib-
uting information on technology. 18 Monies will also be used to organ-
ize "regional ozone workshops" to fill "the need for opportunities to
enable developing countries to exchange views on how to carry out Pro-
tocol activities."'1 19 Similarly, the Fund will guide and coordinate bilat-
eral and multilateral cooperation between states seeking to comply with
provisions of the Montreal Protocol. 120
Only a portion of the total costs of compliance have been funded
because the Fund has been capitalized for only three years.' 2 1 These
costs include establishment of the Executive Committee, preparation of
country reports, training courses and regional workshops, and the
development of specific project proposals. 122 Preliminary estimates
show that the cost of funding the earliest completed and approved pro-
ject proposals (through 1993) may be $120 million, while an additional
$100-120 million may be required for other LDCs that accede to the
Montreal Protocol in the future.' 23
institutional and policy frameworks governing CFCs, and a report of governmental
action taken in response to the Protocol. Id. § II (2).
115. World Bank, Chlorofluorocarbons: Their Influence on the Global Environ-
ment and World Bank Opportunities to Support the Montreal Protocol 9 (Sept. 6,
1990) (unpublished Draft Report) [hereinafter World Bank, Chlorofluorocarbons].
As of May 21, 1991, nineteen countries had completed or were completing draft
reports: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Kenya, and Mexico had completed reports; Ban-
gladesh, Chile, Columbia, Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Thailand, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe were completing reports. Correspon-
dence by author with the Ozone Secretariat, Nairobi, Kenya.
116. A "project" is defined as "any activity qualifying for assistance under the
Fund [and] could include, inter alia, training, technical assistance, pre-investment
studies, country programme preparation, technology development or capital invest-
ments to modify or establish a manufacturing facility." Draft Report of the Third Meeting
of the Executive Committee, supra note 109, annex III, § 111.1 n.2.
117. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex IV, app. I, para. 1.
118. Report of the Second Session of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group of
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, para. 25, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.II(2)/7
(1990) [hereinafter Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group].
119. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex IV, app. I, para. 1.
120. Id. annex IV, app. I, para. 42.
121. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
122. Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, supra note 118,
para. 57.
123. Id.
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2. Contributions
The Fund will be capitalized by voluntary contributions from all parties
not operating under Article 5. Contributions will be requested on the
basis of the United Nations scale of assessments.' 24 Individual states
may reduce their expected contributions, however, by undertaking bilat-
eral or regional cooperation with an Article 5 country, as long as such
cooperation "strictly relates to compliance with the provisions of this
Protocol, provides additional resources, and meets agreed incremental
costs."'125 Cooperation meeting these conditions is considered a contri-
bution to the Fund. Payments to the Fund, however, cannot replace any
other financial aid to those LDCs receiving monies from the Fund; the
London Revisions expressly state that Fund contributions "shall be
additional to other financial transfers to [Article 5 countries]."' 12 6
The Fund's initial capitalization was $160 million, with an addi-
tional $80 million to be made available upon the ratification of more
developing countries.' 2 7 At the time of China's ratification in June
1991, the Fund was increased to $200 million. 12 8 The United States,
contributing twenty-five percent of the United Nations assessments, will
provide a total of $50 million over the three years. 129
B. Administrative Aspects of the Fund
The Fund operates for a three-year period, from January 1, 1991,
through December 31, 1993, or until a permanent Fund is estab-
lished.130 Since the Fund constitutes only an interim financial mecha-
nism, the parties may further refine its structure, functioning and
assessment of compliance costs before a permanent scheme is
developed.
The Executive Committee manages the Fund, with assistance from
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).' 3 1 The First Meet-
ing of the Executive Committee, held in September 1990, discussed the
interrelationship among these entities;' 3 2 an agreement for the roles of
the three U.N. agencies was subsequently signed in March 1991,133 and
124. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex II, art. 10, para. 6.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. annex IV, app. III (multilateral fund for the financial mechanism, scale of
contributions by the parties).
128. Report of the Third Meeting, supra note 65, para. 46.
129. Id.
130. Id. annex IV, app. IV (terms of reference for the interim multilateral fund).
131. Id.
132. Draft Report of the First Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund
Under the Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom. 1/L.2 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Draft Report of the First Meeting of the Executive Committee].
133. ProceduralArrangements Among the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, the United Nations Environment Program, and the United Nations Development Program
for Cooperation and Assistance in Protecting the Ozone Layer in the Context of the Vienna Conven-
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further individual agreements are being negotiated by each agency and
the Executive Committee.' 3 4
The Executive Committee consists of fourteen members. Seven are
selected by Article 5 countries; seven are selected by all other parties. 13 5
The Executive Committee is charged "to develop and monitor the
implementation of specific operational policies, guidelines and adminis-
trative arrangements including the disbursement of resources, for the
purpose of achieving the objectives of the Multilateral Fund under the
Financial Mechanism." 13 6 Additional responsibilities of the Executive
Committee include developing a three-year budget, supervising the
administration of the Fund, developing the criteria for project eligibility,
approving project proposals, reviewing performance reports, and moni-
toring expenses.' 3 7 It must also consider for approval both country
programs and project proposals where incremental costs exceed
$500,000.138
Pursuant to both the London Revisions and the Procedural
Arrangements Among the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, UNEP's role
is to "cooperate and assist in the political promotion of the objectives of
the Protocol, as well as in research, data gathering and the clearing-
house functions."1 39 These functions include assistance in preparing
country-specific studies and identifying a country's needs, assistance in
arranging for technical cooperation, distribution of information, devel-
opment of workshops and training sessions, and the monitoring of other
bilateral and multilateral assistance. 140 Additionally, UNEP serves as
treasurer, receiving contributions and making transfers of monies under
the supervision of the Executive Committee.14 ' Possibly, UNEP's great-
est role lies in "political promotion," which includes "the active promo-
tion of the program to countries not yet Parties to the Protocol."' 4 2
tion and Its Montreal Protocol, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/4/Inf.2 (1991) (effec-
tive March 12, 1991) [hereinafter Procedural Arrangements Among the World Bank, UNEP,
and UNDP].
134. See Draft Agreement between UNDP and the Executive Committee, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/11 (1991); Draft Agreement between UNEP and the Executive Commit-
tee, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/12 (1991); Draft Agreement between World
Bank and the Executive Committee, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/3/13 (1991).
135. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex IV, app. II (terms of reference
of the executive committee). The Chairman and Vice-Chairman are selected from
the Executive Committee members, and serve one-year terms. The position of
Chairman rotates between the two groups, and the Vice-Chairman is chosen by the
group not represented by the Chairman. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. The World Bank will consider and approve projects of lesser amounts. Id.
annex IV, app. IV.
139. Procedural Arrangements Among the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, supra note 133,
para. 1(a).
140. Id.
141. Draft Report of the First Meeting of the Executive Committee, supra note 132, para.
13.
142. Implementing the Multilateral Fund, UN Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/2/3, 4
(1990) (report prepared for the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee, held
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The role of UNDP will be to "cooperate and assist in feasibility and
preinvestment studies and other technical assistance measures." 1 43
The World Bank will "cooperate and assist in administering and
managing the program to finance the agreed incremental costs,' 44 and
as administrator, it will establish a framework for country-specific
reports, develop criteria for project eligibility, manage and supervise
projects, promote economic incentives, and study the feasibility of tech-
nology transfer. 145 While many of these responsibilities appear to over-
lap with those of the Executive Committee, because of its structure,
resources, and expertise in project finance, the World Bank will directly
manage the operations of the Fund while the Executive Committee will
oversee the operations.146
The World Bank's first task is to establish a framework for country
reports that assures a uniform method of preparation by all coun-
tries.' 4 7 Once these reports are prepared, the World Bank will review
individual projects. 148 Criteria that the World Bank currently uses in
determining project eligibility for bank loans include financial, eco-
nomic, institutional, technical and environmental considerations. 149 As
the Fund finances with grants, however, and not with loans, the World
Bank must consider the ramifications of this difference and whether its
existing criteria are applicable.1 50 Additional tasks of the World Bank
will include determining a way to monitor and supervise projects that
are being subsidized by the Fund. 15 1 Given the small size of many of the
projects, this may be performed by intermediate credit institutions. 152
The Fund will be managed by the World Bank under the umbrella
Global Environment Facility (GEF), a $1.2 billion, three-year fund cre-
ated in 1990 to provide grant and concessional aid to LDCs for indus-
trial reforms to address ozone depletion, global warming, loss of
biodiversity, and ocean pollution. 15 3
Dec. 17-19, 1990). In discussing this responsibility of UNEP, the report states that
"UNEP has been successful in promoting international environmental agreements
... and generally in facilitating cooperation between countries, governments, indus-
try and non-governmental organizations." Id.
143. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex IV, app. IV, para. 3(b).
144. Id. para. 3(c).
145. World Bank, Chlorofluorocarbons, supra note 115, at 16.
146. Interview with VijayJagannathan, Analyst, World Bank (Feb. 15, 1991).
For an overview of the resources of the the World Bank and its ability to deal with
environmental issues, see WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1990).
147. World Bank, Chlorofluorocarbons, supra note 115, at 16.
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id.
153. The Global Environment Facility, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 1991, at 24. The Facility will
be administered by the World Bank, responsible for project operations. Id.
Currently there exist two funding operations under the Global Environment Facil-
ity: the Ozone Layer Protection Trust Fund, which is the Fund established pursuant
to the Protocol; and the Global Environment Trust Fund, which includes monies for
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IV. Analysis and Implications of the Multilateral Trust Fund
A. Structural Analysis of the Fund
Analysis of the Fund is difficult because, although the broad framework
is fairly well established, the details of its form and structure are contin-
uously evolving. Generally, the Fund provides for an efficient allocation
of monies for specific projects which have been accepted for financing.
Several weaknesses in the Fund, however, detract from its effectiveness.
1. Identification of Incremental Costs and Definition of Technology Transfer
First, it is difficult to identify and define the specific incremental costs
involved in banning ozone-depleting substances and developing ozone-
safe substitutes. The illustrative list of costs included in the Report of
the Second Meeting' 5 4 is skeletal and may be inaccurate. For example,
one critic of the Fund states that incremental costs for LDCs are mini-
mal, and that expected costs for converting to ozone-safe chemicals are
greatly exaggerated. 155 Before the Fund can finance the costs of pro-
tecting the ozone layer, those costs must be sufficently identified and
estimated. Moreover, the costs should be prioritized by relative impor-
tance and magnitude.
Second, there are no guidelines concerning the transfer of technol-
ogy. Two issues must be addressed if technology transfer is to be effec-
tively implemented: patents and proprietary rights for ozone-safe
technologies as well as the knowledge necessary to use these patents
must be made accessible and affordable to LDCs. 15 6 There is a concern
that the technology to be transferred will be limited to "soft technology,
including publications, personnel exchanges, education and training,"
as opposed to "hard technology," which includes "equipment and
sophisticated operations and processes.' 57 Most programs so far have
only involved multinational seminars and workshops and informational
services-soft technology. 158
Virtually all development and production of CFC substitutes, how-
ever, are occurring only through private industry in industrial countries.
While LDCs desire this technology-India demands that it be given
freely to LDCs-private industries will not readily make the actual tech-
nology available.159 Rather, industries will most likely limit access to the
products, either through direct purchases from plants in industrial coun-
the other three areas to be funded. Success of Global Environment Facility Said To Depend
on World Bank Reforms, 14 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 7 (Apr. 8, 1991).
154. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
155. Interview with Professor Duane Chapman, Dep't of Agriculture Economics,
Cornell Univ. (Feb. 10, 1991). Prof. Chapman argues that the cost of ozone-safe
substitutes themselves is the only real incremental cost, while equipment modifica-
tions, training, and maintenance costs are negligible.
156. Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, supra note 118,
para. 7.
157. Report of the Third Meeting, supra note 65, para. 5.
158. See infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
159. Robert Pool, A Global Experiment in Technology Transfer, 351 NATURE 6 (1991).
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tries, or through joint ventures and licensed operations in LDCs.160 Pri-
vate industries further insist on retaining a controlling interest in joint
ventures.' 6 ' Moreover, companies seek some guarantee by the host
country that the technology will be protected. 162 In addition to these
restrictions, any transfer of technology will be expensive for the
purchasing country. While the Fund will provide the requisite monies
for these transfers, it is unclear whether or not these transfers will actu-
ally occur.
Consequently, parties should issue guidelines as to the specific
activities and transfers that should take place pursuant to the Montreal
Protocol. Even though such guidelines would not bind private enter-
prises, they would allay many of the concerns of both private industry
and governments. The guidelines should establish priorities for tech-
nology transfer, beginning with recycling and conservation programs,
followed by substitution methods (with already existing technologies)
and production technologies.16 3 There should not be a significant lag
in the level of technological development between industrial countries
and LDCs, however. Conservation programs do not adequately substi-
tute for production technologies. If the prioritization results in such a
lag, then a greater amount of technology must be transferred.
LDCs should be able to purchase proprietary rights and patents at
below-cost rates, and alternative technology should be made available to
LDCs free under existing licenses, where possible. 164 Additionally, a
less developed country should be able to own controlling interests in
any joint ventures established in its country. As a precondition to any
below-cost transfer, however, an LDC must guarantee that it will respect
160. Id.
161. Id. (reporting DuPont unwilling to operate a high-technology CFC-replace-
ment plant in LDCs without a controlling interest "in order to guarantee the safety of
the plants").
162. Id. Many LDCs have a reputation for not respecting patents and intellectual
property rights. See, e.g., Prof. Pemberton's article in this issue.
163. See CFC Reduction: Technology Transfer to the Developing World: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on
International Scientific Cooperation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 104-105 (1990) (testimony of Kevin Fay, Executive Director,
Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy) [hereinafter Hearing on CFC Reduction: Technol-
ogy Transfer to the Developing World].
"Recycling, reclamation and conservation technology" is recommended as the
cheapest, most readily available short-term method of reducing CFC production and
consumption, and may result in a 30% reduction. "Current not-in-kind substitution
of products and processes," which seeks to replace CFCs with currently available
non-CFC technologies, should be the next goal, also with a 30% reduction in CFC
use. "Utilization of new compounds," which requires more capital investment and
research, should follow, while "production technology for new compounds" should
be the final step. Draft Summary Report: Implementation of the Montreal Protocol: Informal
Consultative Meeting with Industry, 2-3, U.N. Doc. 0896r-JAL/rf-23 May '90 [hereinafter
Draft Summary Report: Consultative Meeting With Industry].
164. See Draft Summary Report: Consultative Meeting with Industry, supra note 163, at 6.
The European Phenolic Foam Association recommends free transfer under existing
licenses. Id.
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intellectual property laws, and protect the seller's rights. Additionally,
there should be some type of good-faith request that all enterprises will
contribute information promptly, so that no company gains unfair
advantage over other enterprises that release information.' 65 Without
these protections for intellectual property, private industries will not
risk losing their positions in the market by transferring technology and
disseminating information. 1 66
2. Lack of Compliance Measures Regarding Fund Requests and Expenditures
One problem lies in the lack of good-faith requirements governing an
LDC's funding requests and project proposals. Once an Article 5 coun-
try completes a country report, the World Bank should be able to check
for potential inaccuracies in the individual country's assessment of pro-
jected incremental costs, and should be given some opportunity for ver-
ification of these costs. Another problem lies in the lack of
noncompliance measures if monies are not expended as originally pro-
posed. Once disbursements are made, there should be sufficient oppor-
tunity for either the UNDP or the World Bank to monitor actual
expenditures of the money disbursed. Such provisions are necessary to
ensure that abuses do not occur. Therefore, Article 10 might be
amended to include some means of ensuring compliance by LDCs in
expending monies for their proposed purposes. The requirement of
good faith in requesting and expending funds would be an initial step.
Measures involving the operation and administration of the Fund
might be implemented more appropriately by the Executive Committee
than by the parties. For example, the Executive Committee could imple-
ment compliance regulations including regular opportunities to super-
vise approved projects, and possibly even direct management of the
projects. Either the World Bank, as administrator, or UNDP, as a devel-
opmental agency, could undertake these tasks. However, such measures
may prove costly if the projects are diverse and relatively small.167
3. Administration by the World Bank
Given its traditional role as lender, the World Bank must resolve certain
issues in light of its capacity as administrator of the Fund. In encourag-
165. Hearing on CFC Reduction: Technology Transfer to the Developing World, supra note
163, at 106 (testimony of Kevin Fay, Executive Director, Alliance for Responsible
CFC Policy).
The technology transfer process also creates opportunities for mischief
among our global competitors. Clearly, the race to establish market position
in ozone-protecting technologies is on among U.S., European and Japanese
industries. The government needs to apply pressure where necessary so that
the burden of technology transfer is shared along with the benefit.
Id.
166. Id. at 40 (testimony of Robert Reinstein, Dir., Energy & Nat. Res. Trade Pol-
icy, Office of U.S. Trade Rep.).
167. Projects are expected to cost between $10,000 and $100,000, and because of
this small amount, direct management by the World Bank may prove to be costly and
inefficient. World Bank, Chlorofluorocarbons, supra note 115, at 18.
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ing LDCs to comply with both the control measures of the Protocol and
the expenditure requirements of the Fund, the World Bank could possi-
bly make the disbursements of conventional loans contingent on compli-
ance. However, this linkage may be controversial and undesirable,
especially in light of Article 10's requirement that contributions to the
Fund not replace other forms of aid to LDCs. Furthermore, conditional-
ity has generally been a political thorn in international lending prac-
tices. 168 Many LDCs are already leery of World Bank lending practices,
and any contingency concerning Fund monies would likely have major
political repercussions.
Another issue concerns possible conflicts between the goals of the
Fund and other lending policies. Without coordination between the
World Bank's conventional lending decisions and its decisions concern-
ing the Fund, the World Bank could finance a project that potentially
involves ozone-depleting substances, such as food-packaging, refrigera-
tion or electronics. 169 The World Bank would reconcile such conflicts
by conforming its policies with the Fund's goals.
Given that the Fund is managed by the World Bank as part of the
Global Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank must ensure that
the funding and disbursement of the two entities will remain independ-
ent. It has already assured the Executive Committee that the two instru-
ments will remain separate, although administered by the same
organizational unit.17 0 The joint administration of the two funding
mechanisms has several advantages. A single unit administering both
mechanisms would make administration more efficient. Furthermore,
the GEF can be used to provide monies to countries that may not qualify
for funds under the Montreal Protocol. 17 1 For example, a country
which may be defined as "developing" may still have a per capita con-
sumption greater than the 0.3 kilograms, which would make it ineligible
for treatment under Article 5. Funding may be available through the
GEF, however. The role of the World Bank in administering the two
funds is quite different, and this difference must be preserved; while the
World Bank will be the decision-making body for the Global Environ-
ment Facility, its role in connection with the Fund will be for the most
part mechanical, with decisions made by the Executive Committee.172
4. Inadequate Capitalization
The effectiveness of the Fund may be limited by its own capitalization.
The Fund was originally capitalized at $160 million, and with the acces-
sion of additional developing countries to the Montreal Protocol, has
increased to $200 million. This amount represents only the require-
168. See infra note 260.
169. World Bank, Chlorofluorocarbons, supra note 115, at 19.
170. Draft Report of the Third Meeting of the Executive Committee, supra note 109, para.
61.
171. News Briefing of the Global Environment Facility, Federal News Service, May 2,
1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File).
172. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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ment for the first three years, through 1993, and may be adequate to
finance the costs involved during those years. 17 3 The costs of the first
three years, however, involve a great deal of preparatory work and sev-
eral clearinghouse functions 174 but do not cover the bulk of the costs
involved in moving from ozone-depleting to ozone-safe industries.
These costs will be incurred only after completion and approval of the
country reports and project proposals.
While estimates of the costs involved in banning ozone-depleting
substances fluctuate greatly, all are significantly greater than $200 mil-
lion. Consultants working with UNEP have estimated the total needs of
all LDCs to be between $1.8 and $5.0 billion for the next ten to eighteen
years, even considering the ten-year delay. 175 China and India alone
estimate costs between $1.5 billion and $2.0 billion.17 6 Preliminary
reports from other LDCs indicate that the aggregate costs of phasing
out consumption of ozone-depleting substances will be high. 177 Con-
tributing parties have agreed to fund "agreed incremental costs" as
determined by the Executive Committee and identified by the parties in
the Second Meeting. 17 8 While agreement by the parties was reached
concerning a three-year, $200 million commitment, the parties may have
difficulty in agreeing upon longer and more costly commitments.
In addition to the potential problems in future capitalization, the
Fund has already encountered a significant problem in its current capi-
talization: industrial countries that have pledged funds have yet to pay.
As of June 1991, only $12.7 million of $80 million committed for the
year had been received. 17 9 There must be some enforcement mecha-
nism so that countries that have pledged funds will pay promptly. This
173. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
175. Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, supra note 118, at 9.
176. Inter Press Service, Environment: Britain Calls for Massive Cuts in CFC Use, June
20, 1990, (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File).
The estimated cost to India through 2010 is as much as $1.2 billion (this is the
present value cost). Overseas Development Administration, Reducing the Consump-
tion of Ozone Depleting Substances in India: Phase I: The Cost of Complying with
the Montreal Protocol (Draft Report, Feb. 22, 1990) (on file with Cornell Int'l Law
Journal). See also Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, supra note
118, at 5.
177. Egypt estimates that the cost for phasing out its consumption of CFCs ranges
from $30.5 to $37.8 million. Egyptian Environment Affairs Agency, Costs to Egypt
of Protecting the Stratospheric Ozone Layer (Egypt Case Study, 1st ed. June 1990)
(on file with Cornell Int'l Law Journal).
Mexico estimates that the cost for phasing out its consumption of CFCs ranges
from $64.4 to $118.7 million. SECRETARiA DE DESARROLLO URBANO Y ECOLOGiA,
CAMARA NACIONAL DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA TRANSFORMACI6N & U.S. E.P.A., CASE
STUDY OF THE COST TO MEXICO OF PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER ix (1990).
178. See supra note 111.
179. Report of the Third Meeting, supra note 65, para. 15. As of August 13, 1991, only
12 of 72 parties had contributed money to the Fund. Inter Press Service, Environment:
Third World Wants More Funds To Restore Ozone, August 13, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File). There are already projects to be financed, but the funds have not been
attained. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal
enforcement mechanism should also ensure that donor countries are
not substituting other forms of aid for contributions to the Fund. UNEP
is already charged with the responsibilities of collecting contributions
and supervising other forms of aid,18 0 but additional measures would
help to ensure compliance and prompt payment by industrial countries.
For example, either UNEP might be given authority, or the Executive
Committee might be allowed, to impose penalties, such as a certain per-
centage of the money owed, for late payments.
B. Legal Implications of the Fund
The Fund represents the culmination of the overall process of the multi-
lateral negotiations, a crystallization of the goals and principles embod-
ied in the Montreal Protocol. As such, the creation of the Fund has
many legal implications, of which only two will be discussed in this Note:
questions of state liability and questions of feasibility. The Fund is a
product of a new regime of cooperative international environmental
lawmaking l' l where liability need not be imposed for effective regula-
tion. Existing legal structures, however, may make the Fund's existence
virtually meaningless in actually effectuating new regulations.18 2
1. Questions of State Liability
Neither the Montreal Protocol nor the London Revisions makes any
explicit reference to state liability for the destruction of the ozone layer.
No individual country or group of countries was considered blamewor-
thy or singled out for regulation; control measures applied to all parties,
including, to a lesser extent, LDCs. Although the Montreal Protocol
recognized the needs of LDCs, it did not imply that these needs were the
responsibility of industrial countries.
The London Revisions raise questions of state liability because
industrial countries must make payments through the Fund to " 'blame-
less' developing countries"' 8 3 which might otherwise be penalized by
the additional costs of protecting the ozone layer. Furthermore, the
industrial countries are now responsible for ensuring compliance of
LDCs through adequate implementation of Articles 10 and 10A. 8 4
LDCs receive special treatment in the future because they did not reap
the benefits of CFCs in the past. Industrial countries for decades have
enjoyed artificially low costs of CFC consumption and production at the
expense of the stratospheric commons.' 8 5 They have been the prover-
bial "free-riders." Nevertheless, while the London Revisions may imply
liability, no explicit reference to liability is made.
180. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of
Environmental Regulation, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 421 (1989).
182. See infra notes 217-41 and accompanying text.
183. Handl, International Efforts, supra note 3, at 253.
184. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, the Fund does not involve compensatory reparations to
LDCs as victims of past wrongdoing of industrial countries. Rather, the
Fund finances the future needs of LDCs. Contributions to the Fund are
made on a neutral basis, determined by the U.N. scale of assess-
ments. 186 Indeed, several LDCs have strongly advocated that contribu-
tions be determined on a polluter-pays basis,' 8 7 but this method was
rejected during the negotiations of the Second Meeting.' 8 8 Conse-
quently, the basis for determining contributions to the Fund bears no
implication of liability, but the amended Protocol does raise the ques-
tion of whether such implication may be necessary for effective environ-
mental regulation.
a. Liability Within a Traditional International Legal Regime
Most legal scholars and international organizations believe that the crea-
tion of affirmative responsibilities to prevent transboundary environ-
mental harm is a necessary precondition for the imposition of an
obligation to compensate for harm when it actually occurs.18 9 In other
words, state responsibility is based principally on the existence of pri-
mary obligations of states. 190 Consequently, efforts have been made to
develop explicit international agreements that define these primary
obligations.
The most notable effort in this area was the Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment (the "Stockholm Declaration"). 19 1 The
186. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
187. Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, supra note 118,
annex I. A proposal by China, Finland, the Netherlands and the Group of 77 called
for contributions "on an obligatory basis by the Parties not operating under Article 5
of the Protocol in proportion to their calculated level of consumption of controlled
substances in 1986." Id.
188. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, para. 27.
189. Sanford E. Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Environmental Liabil-
ity: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARv. INT'L. LJ. 311,
313 (1989). These "affirmative duties on states to conform their conduct to interna-
tional norms" are known as primary obligations. Id.
190. Id. See also Ved P. Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-
A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 HARV. INr'L. LJ. 375 (1989) [hereinafter Nanda, Global
Warming].
Both Gaines, supra note 189, and Nanda, supra, base their conclusions on the Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fortieth Session, 43 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/43/10 (1988).
The International Law Commission (the "ILC") draws a distinction between
"responsibility" and "liability." The former applies only to unlawful acts, while the
latter applies to lawful acts. "Responsibility" for unlawful acts is based on a body of
"secondary norms," which are the legal consequences of violating "primary norms."
The ILC focuses on primary norms and limits responsibility only to the extent that a
primary norm is violated. See BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 114-15.
191. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972) [hereinafter Stock-
holm Declaration]. Specifically, the Stockholm Declaration provides that,
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage
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Stockholm Declaration embodies the principles of not only state respon-
sibility, but also state sovereignty. The sovereignty of a state includes
the freedom to exploit its natural resources as long as it does not
infringe upon the rights of another state. 19 2 Such infringement occurs
only when an identifiable state is harmed in an identifiable way.' 93 In
terms of global environmental problems, this requirement renders the
current legal system inadequate in two respects. First, liability will be
imposed only after "clear and convincing" damage, 1 9 4 so that there is no
incentive for states to take preventive measures. Second, environmental
harms, especially ozone depletion, affect all states and cannot be attrib-
uted to any one state. Consequently, it may be impossible to determine
the scope and source of liability. 195
In isolated cases states have been required to compensate for past
damage, but to date transboundary environmentally harmful activities
have never been enjoined. 196 In addition, states have traditionally not
been held responsible for private activity unless "the polluting state has
failed to take the steps normally required of a 'good government.' 1i97
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
Id. The Stockholm Declaration also provides that "[s]tates shall cooperate to develop
further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction
or control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction." Id. principle 22.
192. See Pierre DuPuy, International Liability of States for Damage Caused by Transfrontier
Pollution, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 350 (OECD ed. 1977).
No state has the right to use its territory, or allow its territory to be used, in
such a way that smoke causes damage to the territory of another neighboring
state or to the property of persons in such territory, if the consequences are
serious and if the damage is proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. (citing Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938, 1965 (1941)
(holding that a state has "an obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used
for acts contrary to the rights of other states")). For an affirmation of the arbitral
decision of the Trail Smelter case, see Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4
(1949).
193. Nanda, Global Warming, supra note 190, at 383; Gaines, supra note 189, at 316-
17.
The Trail Smelter tribunal held that "the injury [must be] established by clear and
convincing evidence." 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
194. C. Odidi Okidi, The Prospects for Cooperation Among Developing Countries in Legal
Aspects of Control of Transboundary Air Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY AiR POLLurION, supra
note 10, at 235.
195. Nanda, Global Warming, supra note 190, at 383-84.
196. Gaines, supra note 189, at 316-17; Nanda, Global Warming, supra note 190, at
382-84. Specific examples include Trail Smelter and Cofu Channel. See supra note 192.
197. Dupuy, supra note 192, at 353.
When transfrontier pollution results from the actions of private persons, state lia-
bility will depend on whether adequate controls existed that the polluter evaded, or
whether there were insufficient controls imposed by the state. "[A] state cannot be
held a priori to be liable for the misbehavior of all private persons in its territory ....
It is obliged only to ensure that its government functions properly in accordance with
international obligations." Id. at 354.
See also BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 119 (noting that states are held liable for their
citizens' conduct only "in case of failure to carry out governmental functions in due
diligence and in accordance with international duties.") Id.
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In other words, governments are only liable when they have been negli-
gent either by failing to regulate a private activity or by affirmatively
engaging in the polluting activity. In the case of ozone depletion, state
governments have had a minimal role in the production and consump-
tion of CFCs, and they have not been negligent in failing to impose reg-
ulations on CFC production or consumption. States would therefore
not be held liable under customary international law.
While the present international legal regime requires states to regu-
late activities within theirjurisdictions in order to prevent pollution else-
where, there is no mechanism to enforce this requirement. Thus, while
state responsibility may be accepted in theory, state liability is not
imposed in practice. Underlying this dichotomy are the inviolate doc-
trine of state sovereignty and the inherent nature of environmental
problems.1 98 Consequently, the promise of the Stockholm Declaration
to "develop further international law regarding liability and compensa-
tion" has failed to materialize.
As a result, scholars have looked for other models from which to
create some responsibility for state action. One critic asserts that the
existence of primary obligations is not needed to establish trans-
boundary environmental liability.' 9 9 Furthermore, "environmental lia-
bility cannot effectively correct every instance of transnational
environmental damage that threatens regional and global ecosystems.
Neither can liability function as the principle legal device for articulation
and enforcement of standards of behavior to protect the environ-
ment." 200 Without actually imposing liability, states should explore the
goals and principles of liability in developing a strategy for environmen-
tal protection.201
The Montreal Protocol exemplifies this type of approach. Gener-
ally, liability seeks to deter future wrongdoing and to compensate for
past harms.20 2 The regulatory scheme of the Montreal Protocol seeks to
eliminate all future wrongdoing in the production of ozone-depleting
substances; the financial mechanism of the Montreal Protocol seeks to
redistribute monies from countries that have benefitted from past CFC
production to countries that have not so benefitted. Whether such
redistribution is labelled as compensation or assistance is merely an
issue of semantics. Indeed, from a practical standpoint, a compensatory
scheme would be much less manageable than an assistance scheme.
Compensation requires defining legal damages and then determining a
value for the damages.20 3 Although difficult to ascertain, compensation
is generally easier to measure than future costs of deterrence or injunc-
198. Gaines, supra note 189, at 316-17; PhilippeJ. Sands, The Environment, Commu-
nity and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393 (1989).
199. Gaines, supra note 189, at 313-14.
200. Id. at 315-16.
201. Id. at 347.
202. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (5th
ed. 1984).
203. Gaines, supra note 189, at 324.
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tion.20 4 Ozone depletion presents an opposite situation, because esti-
mates of the future cost of banning ozone-depleting substances are
generally predictable, whereas the costs of redressing health and envi-
ronmental problems are immeasurable. 20 5 The principles of liability are
thus served by the current structure of the Fund. Capital is more effi-
ciently transferred from industrial countries to LDCs without a strict
imposition of liability.
b. Liability within a Cooperative International Legal Regime
Another alternative to a system of liability is a system of cooperation, as
characterized by the proliferation of multilateral treaties in recent
years. 20 6 This development challenges many of the precepts of the
existing international legal regime.20 7 The Stockholm Declaration was
the first major effort toward a legal system of coordinated, multilateral
cooperation. 20 8 In addition to calling for cooperation in developing
laws of liability and compensation, it called for cooperation generally in
seeking solutions to environmental problems. The Stockholm Declara-
tion identified bilateral and multilateral agreements as means for achiev-
ing cooperation. 20 9  Thus, international treaty law attempts to
accomplish through such cooperation what international customary law
could not. The recent report by the World Commission on Environ-
204. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911, 1920-34
(1938).
205. The total worldwide cost of eliminating ozone-depleting substances ranges
from $1.8 to $5.0 billion. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. The actual cost
of ozone depletion cannot be measured accurately, due to "irreversible effects of
unprecedented dimensions," including 114,000 new cases of skin cancer and
unknown crop losses. BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 78-79.
206. Nanda, Global Warming, supra note 190, at 384-85. See generally Hahn & Rich-
ards, supra note 181.
Hahn and Richards document the signing by the U.S. of sixteen multilateral trea-
ties concerning environmental regulation in the 1970s and 1980s, compared with
seven in the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 425, 445-46.
207. See Nanda, Ozone Depletion, supra note 31, at 493. Commenting on the state of
international environmental law prior to the 1985 Vienna Convention, Nanda states,
[t]he dearth of effective international norms and mechanisms to address
questions of global environment, especially its management, is a reflection of
the horizontal nature of the world community, which generally lacks a cen-
tralized authority to prescribe norms. Consequently, until recently, efforts
toward environmental management have been sporadic and ineffectual and
the development of international environmental law has been slow and its
role rather limited.
Id.
208. See, e.g., BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 143.
209. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 191, principle 24. This principle provides,
[i]nternational matters concerning protection and improvement of the envi-
ronment should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big or
small, on an equal footing. Cooperation through multilateral or bilateral
arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control,
prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from
activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of
the sovereignty and interests of all States.
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ment and Development ("Brundtland Report") recognized "new imper-
atives and new opportunities for international cooperation" in light of
the transboundary effects of domestic environmental, economic and
financial policies,2 10 and it further recommended a wide range of legal
and institutional changes to facilitate international cooperation. 21 1
While some may argue that there is no legal incentive to cooperate with-
out threat of liability, the shortcomings of this argument have already
been discussed.2 1 2 Cooperation should proceed not on the basis of the
legal threat of liability against a few states, but on the basis of the scien-
tifically proven threat of global environmental damage to all states.2 1 3
Consequently, the Montreal Protocol is no less effective by avoiding
implications of liability. While it may be disingenuous, it mitigates polit-
ical antagonism between industrial countries and LDCs2 1 4 and allows
for greater cooperation in effectuating the goals of the Montreal Proto-
col. Indeed, virtually all negotiations on environmental problems have
avoided questions of liability.2 1 5 Liability need not be addressed in mul-
tilateral treaties, which are prescriptive rather than remedial. 2 16 As a
means of effectuating the prescriptive goals of the Montreal Protocol,
the Fund is foward-looking, designed to prevent future damage, rather
than backward-looking, attempting to compensate for past damage.
2. Questions of Feasibility
Despite the indications that states are forging new cooperative methods
in order to achieve global environmental protection, there are legal bar-
riers to any meaningful realization of such methods. These barriers are
founded upon the dualism of international and domestic legal systems
and upon the separation of public and private legal systems. Despite
multilateral commitments, states may not necessarily promulgate com-
210. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 312.
211. id. at 313-42.
212. See supra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
213. Nanda states that "international cooperation will provide a more effective
solution to the problem than will the threat of liability." Nanda, Global Warming, supra
note 190, at 385. He does not state for what reasons such cooperation should be
undertaken.
214. See infra notes 252-63 and accompanying text.
215. Gaines, supra note 189, at 318. "[G]overnments have sought to avoid the
issue rather than face an indeterminate obligation to pay compensation for routine
economic activities." Id.
Many conventions call for preventive measures concerning environmental pollu-
tion, although none explicitly mentions liability. Rather, they discuss problems of
liability and postpone any resolution until the future. See Alfred Rest, Responsibility
and Liability for Transboundaiy Air Pollution Damage, in TRANSBOUNDARY Ant POLLUTION,
supra note 10, at 302-04.
216. See Rest, supra note 215, at 302.
As [some] conventions ... are of a 'preventive and planning' character as far
as their contents are concerned, and a violation of these contractual duties
leads eo ipso to liability under the international law of treaties, an explicit pro-
vision on liability does not seem absolutely necessary and is thus rarely
found.
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plementary domestic laws to meet those commitments. Additionally,
while in recent years states have been encouraging cooperative efforts,
private enterprises have sought more restrictive policies regarding trade
and technology transfer.
a. Barriers between Municipal and International Legal Regimes
Provisions in the Montreal Protocol and the London Revisions recog-
nize that the fulfilment of international obligations may be restricted by
the domestic laws of individual states. The Montreal Protocol states that
Parties shall cooperate in the exchange of information and technology
insofar as such cooperation is "consistent with their national laws, regu-
lations and practices." '217 Additionally, the potential conflict between a
state's domestic laws and international treaty law is recognized in the
London Revisions specifically in terms of the transfer of technology:
"Each Party shall take every practicable step" to ensure that technology
is transferred expeditiously and fairly. 218
These caveats in the Montreal Protocol and the London Revisions
illustrate the inherent limitations of international law, which stem from
the principle of state sovereignty. 21 9 Even the Stockholm Declaration
limits itself by stating that national "systems of values" must be consid-
ered in international cooperation. 220 The efficacy of international laws
largely depends on the implementation of domestic laws. Many states
party to the Montreal Protocol have already enacted domestic legislation
conforming to the control measures of the Montreal Protocol. 22 1 How-
ever, there has been no domestic legislation by any party concerning
217. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 9, para. 1. See also BRUNNEE, supra note
23, at 245.
218. Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, annex II, art. 10A.
219. See Sands, supra note 198, at 398-400.
International society is seen as a community of states, where states are the only
recognized legal entities, and non-state persons-legal and natural-have no stand-
ing to protect their interests.
The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doc-
trine of the law of nations .... The principal corollaries of the sovereignty
and equality of states are: (1) a jurisdiction, primafacie exclusive, over a terri-
tory... [and] (2) a duty of nonintervention in the area of exclusive jurisdic-
tion of other states.
Id. at 398 (quoting IAN BROWNLUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNAMONAL LAw 287 (3d
ed. 1979)).
220. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 191, principle 23. This principle provides,
[w]ithout prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the interna-
tional community, or to standards which will have to be determined nation-
ally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing
in each country and the extent of the applicability of standards which are
valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate.., for
the developing countries.
Id.
221. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency has issued regula-
tions under the Clean Air Act that ban ozone-depleting substances. Protection of
Stratospheric Ozone, 40 C.F.R. pt. 82 (1988). The European Community has
enacted legislation that bans ozone-depleting substances by 1997, three years before
the Protocol requirement. Council Regulation 594/91 of 4 Mar. 1991 on Substances
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technology transfer. Given the Montreal Protocol's qualifications on
technology transfer, there is no incentive to institute such legislation.
b. Barriers Between Private and Public Legal Regimes
The deficiency in the amended Protocol due to the lack of obligatory
provisions applicable to governments in the Montreal Protocol is exac-
erbated by the presumption that private industry will not readily transfer
"hard technology" 22 2 without the imposition of domestic regulations.
It is well-recognized that "governments have little space to maneuver
with private industries beyond persuasion and incentives. '2 23 The flow
of privately-developed technology to LDCs has been impeded by the
general protectionist policies that govern the activities of many states
and private enterprises, the lack of direct foreign investment in LDCs,
and restrictive technology transfer agreements when such investment
does occur.2 24
Pressures for protectionism have grown in the 1980s for several
reasons. These include the global recession of the early 1980s, the shift
in balance of payments among industrial countries, and the growing
debt crisis among LDCs.2 25 Additionally, domestic economies have
experienced structural changes that have pressured countries to export
more goods and to reduce the flexibility of their labor force. 22 6
Although tariff restrictions have decreased, non-tariff barriers have
grown "in the form of global and bilateral quotas, orderly marketing
arrangements, voluntary export restraints and safeguard measures." 2 27
These policies have hampered the growth and diversification of exports
to all countries, 228 but LDCs, which are heavily dependent on foreign
markets, have been especially hurt.2 29
Recent trends in foreign direct investment have also hindered tech-
nology transfer. While foreign investment in LDCs has increased in
absolute terms, investment in LDCs has declined from twenty-seven per-
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1991 O.J.(L67)1. Japan has also issued legislation
implementing the Protocol. See BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7000.
222. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
223. Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, supra note 118,
para. 7.
224. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 29, 83-87.
225. JAMES RIEDEL, MYTHS AND REALITY OF EXTERNAL CoNTRAINTs ON DEVELOP-
MENT 75-76 (1987).
226. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 141-42 (1987) [hereinafter
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1987].
227. RIEDEL, supra note 225, at 77. Riedel notes, however, that the effect of these
barriers is difficult to gauge, and agrees that protectionism may not have significantly
affected the growth of LDCs. Id. at 78-79.
228. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 83. See generally WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1987, supra note 226, at 148-52.
229. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS: A COMMON-
WEALTH PERSPECTIVE 34-35 (1980) (report prepared by a Group of Experts appointed
by the Heads of Commonwealth Governments).
See also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1989, supra note 76, at 15. Approximately
207o of the exports from LDCs face non-tariff barriers, while only 10% of exports
from industrial countries face such barriers. Id.
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cent of total foreign direct investment in 1981-1983 to twenty percent in
1984-1988.230 UNESCO reports that this decrease is "due largely to the
increasing importance of technologically intensive direct investments
during the 1980s, which favor locations in other developed countries
and the less favorable investment climate in developing countries owing
to their heavy debt burden and/or political and economic instabil-
ity." 23 1 Generally, technology exporters from industrial countries have
little opportunity to make a profit on account of the small technology
markets in LDCs, and therefore do not invest in LDCs. 23 2
Furthermore, when direct investment in LDCs does occur, it is
often restricted by transnational investors themselves. Much of the
direct investment in LDCs has involved the transfer of technology,
either through purchases or licenses of equipment, patents, or trade-
marks.23 3 Technology markets have generally been characterized by
monopoly rather than by competition 23 4 and consequently transnation-
als have a powerful bargaining position in relation to enterprises in
LDCs. Further, LDCs often lack technical information and suffer from
unstable economic, political, and legal structures. 23 5 As a consequence,
technology transfer agreements have been frought with unfair and
restrictive business practices. 23 6 These practices have hindered technol-
230. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, 16TH SEss., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8-10, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1990/2
(1990).
The level of foreign direct investment to LDCs increased from $10.392 billion in
1983 to $25.097 billion in 1988. Total foreign direct investment has outpaced this
growth, and foreign direct investment in LDCs has decreased as a percentage of the
total. Direct foreign investment in developed countries increased from 73% in 1981-
1983 to 80% in 1984-1988. Id.
231. Id. at 10. See generally Michael Blakeney, Transfer of Technology and Developing
Nations, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 689, 703-4 (1988).
232. Blakeney, supra note 231, at 702-3.
233. David Dichter & Klaus Netter, A New Look at Foreign Investment, DEVELOPMENT
FORUM, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 3.
234. Guo Qjngjiang, Restrictive Business Practices Bar Technology Flow to Developing
Countries, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 117, 118. This position is supported by the fact
that "[i]n 1980, industrialized market economies accounted for 65 percent of the
world total of patents granted... [while] developing countries held only 6 percent,
and most of these had been granted to non-residents." BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra
note 2, at 87.
235. Guo, supra note 234, at 118.
236. Id. "Restrictive business practices were found in almost all technology trans-
fer agreements studied by the U.N. Conference on Technology and Development
(UNCTAD)." Id. Such practices include, inter alia: (1) requirements that transferees
"grant back any improvement on licensed technology without reciprocal treatment,"
(2) restrictions that transferees deal exclusively with the transferor, (3) restrictions on
the transferees' "own research on related technology," (4) restrictions on trans-
feree's ability to adapt technology for regional needs and (5) price-fixing. Id. at 118-
19 (reference is made to Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 773 (1980)).
For an analysis of several of these practices, see Blakeney, supra note 231, at 708-
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ogy transfer more than encouraged it.23 7 Although many international
organizations have attempted to regulate transfer agreements through
public international law, problems still exist. 23 8
Without reducing barriers to technology transfer by restructuring
the international economic system or by imposing a legal regulatory
scheme, private enterprise lacks incentive to cooperate with states in
pursuing the goals of the Montreal Protocol. The legal obligations of
the Protocol extend only as far as public international law does-it car-
ries no legal obligation within private international law. Although the
Protocol obligates industrial states to transfer ozone-safe technology to
LDCs, the technology is not the states' to give.
Private industry owns virtually all of the patents and licenses involv-
ing CFC and CFC-substitute production.23 9 In practice, decisions per-
taining to technology transfer do not concern states that ratified the
Protocol but rather concern the individual corporations that manufac-
ture the relevant chemicals. Although the Fund may provide the monies
necessary to purchase licenses and patented information, the manufac-
turers must make the initial decision to sell these licenses and informa-
tion. 240 Without any coordination between the public and private
sectors, the efficacy of the Fund will depend completely on voluntary
gestures by private industry.
One controversial solution would allow governments acting under
domestic patent law to assume ownership of a patent if such ownership
would be "in the public interest for the protection of human health or
for national security reasons." 24 1 While fair compensation would be
provided to the patent holder, the government would be free to dissemi-
nate the technology.
237. Blakeney, supra note 231, at 710-11. Technology transfer has often involved
"mutually incriminating and acrimonious dialogue." Because LDCs have attempted
to take advantage of new technology introduced into their country, transnational
licensors have reacted with numerous restrictions, to which LDCs have in turn
reacted with protective measures. See Dichter & Netter, supra note 233, at 3.
238. See Guo, supra note 234, at 134, 137. UNCTAD has drafted an International
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. See supra note 236. See also General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, Restrictive Business Practices-Arrangements for
Consultations: Decision of 18 November 1960, 9 BASIC INSTRUMENTs AND SE.LECTED
DocUMENTs 28 (1961).
239. Producers of ozone-depleting substances are private enterprises in the United
States, Western Europe, andJapan. Producers in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia,
South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, and Venezuela are all licensees, subsidiaries, or joint
ventures of companies operating in industrial countries. No information is available
for China or for the independent republics of the former USSR. See BRADLEY ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 543.7003 E; FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 89, at 10.
240. Transnationals such as DuPont and ICI initially refused to negotiate any sale
of technology, stating that they invested more than $8 billion total in research. See
Environment- Third World Compromise on CFCs?, Inter Press Service, June 29, 1990
(LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File).
Several LDCs, notably Malaysia, have expressed fears that because of the lack of
mandatory provisions, private industry is at liberty to "hold the world 'to ransom.'
Id.
241. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, supra note 89, at 22.
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c. Trends in the Transfer of Ozone-Safe Technology
Despite the systemic limitations on technology transfer, both private
industry and governments have made significant efforts to facilitate the
flow of ozone-safe technology.
On the government side, the EPA has been particularly active. It is
publishing a series of manuals on how to reduce and eliminate the use of
CFCs; it has planned several conferences; and it has funded and assisted
several countries on case studies.24 2
On the private side, a consortium of U.S. electronics firms has
formed the non-profit Industry Cooperative for the Ozone Layer Protec-
tion (ICOLP), which has facilitated the dissemination of non-proprietary
information by means of workshops and on-line systems that access data
concerning ozone-safe technology. 24 3 ICOLP has disseminated an elec-
tronics-cleaning technology developed by Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion.2 4 4 The Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance has formed
another group, the Center for Emissions Control, which is collecting
and disseminating emission-reduction technology. 245 In addition,
online databases that provide information on CFC substitutes have been
established for the refrigeration industry. These databases are readily
available throughout the world, often on desktop computers.2 4 6 A mul-
timillion dollar research program, Materials Compatibility and Lubri-
cant Research Program, co-funded by government and industry, has
been proposed in the U.S. to provide comprehensive data on CFC sub-
stitutes. If established, this program will make research results available
"without limitation. ' '24 7
In conjunction with the U.S. government and private industry, Mex-
ico has provided an innovative model for technology transfer. Mexico
announced in July 1991 that it will eliminate CFC production and con-
sumption from its manufacturing industry by the year 2000, ten years
earlier than required under Article 5.248 Engineers from Northern
Telecom and the EPA will conduct workshops and plant visits and
will share information on alternative technologies with Mexican
engineers. 24 9
242. Hearing on CFC Reduction: Technology Transfer to the Developing World, supra note
163, at 35 (statement of Eileen Claussen, Director, Office of Atmospheric and Indoor
Air Programs, EPA).
243. 33 ASHRAEJOURNAL 7 (1991).
244. Draft Summary Report: Consultative Meeting with Industry, supra note 163, at 4.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 7.
247. Id.
248. Mexico, Northern Telecom and U.S. EPA Initiates [sic] First Program to Eliminate
CFCsfrom Electronics Manufacturing, Business Wire, July 8, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File).
249. Id. Specifically, the program calls for the following: a planning seminar to
explain the program to Mexican engineers, questionnaires to be completed for each
plant in Mexico, analysis and recommendations by Northern Telecom and EPA
experts for each plant, given in consulting sessions, on-site checks and workshops to
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While these efforts represent a positive step, they have been limited
in scope. All of the existing databases involve non-proprietary informa-
tion. Private industry emphasizes that technology transfer has histori-
cally occurred either through joint ventures or licenses, and that transfer
of CFC-substitute technology should be no different.250 Private indus-
try further maintains that "technology transfer will occur naturally,
251
and discourages any government regulatory measures. Without govern-
ment regulation, however, the systemic limitations may prevent mean-
ingful transfer of hard technology.
C. Political Implications of the Fund
The Fund represents a commitment by industrialized countries to
finance the costs of the developing world in protecting the global envi-
ronment. This commitment has several potentially explosive political
implications. These include the issue of political accountability (even
where there is no legal liability) and the nature of the political precedent
(even where there is no legally binding precedent). As for the former,
the Fund recognizes past inequities in the global economy; as for the
latter, the Fund suggests future mechanisms for protecting the global
environment.
1. Political Accountability and Economic Development
Neither the Montreal Protocol nor its London Revisions imposes spe-
cific liability for ozone depletion. While it may be legally unnecessary,
the political implication of liability may be inevitable. Industrial coun-
tries benefitted from using CFCs at the expense of the ozone layer.
Their economies profitted from the artificially low cost of CFC products;
manufacturers produced and consumers purchased at lower costs, while
destroying the ozone layer. This inequality exemplifies the larger imbal-
ance in the global economy.25 2 The creation and structure of the Fund
address some of the concerns LDCs have about this imbalance, and pro-
vides a new multilateral structure which transfers capital to LDCs.
provide Mexican engineers with hands-on experience, and implementation of alter-
native technologies. The program should last three years. Id.
250. Draft Summary Report: Consultative Meeting with Industry, supra note 163, at 9.
(based on a presentation by representatives of Allied Signal, ICI, Atochem, DuPont
and Montefluos).
251. Hearing on CFC Reduction: Technology Transfer to the Developing World, supra note
163, at 103 (testimony of Kevin Fay, Executive Director, Alliance for Responsible
CFC Policy). "In reality, technology transfer occurs all the time in our economy as a
means of expanding product usage and marketing." Id. at 102.
252. See Brian Welsh, Getting Serious About Ozone, FORUM, May-June 1989, at 1, 15.
At the London Meeting [in 1989], India and China repeated Third World
critiques heard 17 years ago .... "[I]ndustrialized countries had profited
from many years of cheap costs of energy and labor and have seen the
accumulation of a great amount of wealth at the expense of environmental
pollution."
Id. (quoting Dr. Liu Ming Pu, head of the Chinese delegation).
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Many scholars, from both industrial countries and LDCs, assert that
LDCs have been economically dominated by industrialized nations for
decades. 253 Political independence of LDCs belies any implication of
economic independence. "[F]rom the perspectives of the developing
world, many of the traditional legal principles are considered to be tools
of the industrialized nations to maintain their dominant position in rela-
tion to the poorer nations." 25 4 The fact that the traditional multilateral
lending institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), base voting power on contributions 2 55 further illus-
trates this economic domination.2 56 LDCs have typically played little
role in the financing decisions that benefit them.2 57
Recently, however, LDCs have sought to increase self-reliance by
encouraging domestic savings and by expanding trade with both indus-
trial countries and other LDCs. 258 Through the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), less-developed nations have called for
greater resource transfer on concessional terms and greater liberaliza-
tion of trade.2 5 9 For resource transfer, many LDCs advocate program
financing, which gives them more control, rather than project financing,
253. While it is beyond the scope of this Note to examine the nature and extent of
this domination, there are numerous sources supporting this notion. See, e.g.,
MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979) (a
UNESCO report); CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER, DEVELOPMENT FINANCING: A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL Co-
OPERATION (1982) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT FINANCING].
254. BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 141.
255. Authority for decisions of the World Bank is held by a Board of Governors,
with each member of the Board a representative of a member country. The voting
power of each member is proportional to the financial contribution of the country
represented by that member. Bruce M. Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Envi-
ronmental Policy, and the United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681, 684 (1985) (citing Articles
of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, opened
for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1503, 2 U.N.T.S. 134,
amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929)).
256. See, e.g., LalJayawardena, The "Massive Transfer" of Resources to Developing Coun-
tries, in DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, supra note 253, at 56-57.
[M]any developing countries deal with the established [lending] institutions
in terms of an "us" and "them" set of attitudes. The institution is invariably
perceived as being a foreign and alien body laying down terms to a recipient
country .... Contributing heavily to this perception is the heavy weightage of
developed countries in both voting within these institutions as well as in their
staffing.
Id.
257. Dragoslav Avramovic, Open Issues in International Finance, in DEVELOPMENT
FINANCING, supra note 253, at 3. ("Developing countries do not have an adequate
share of responsibility for decision-making, control and management of most of the
existing international financial and monetary institutions.")
Additionally, LDCs can institute domestic legislation and programs to stimulate
foreign investment, but "these devices are of only marginal significance in determin-
ing whether or not to invest. By and large, developing countries play a relatively
passive role in determining the volume of direct inward investment." RIEDEL, supra
note 225, at 70.
258. REIDEL, supra note 225, at 4.
259. Id.
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which gives the lender control.260 The Declaration on the Establish-
ment of the New International Economic Order (the NIEO) has
addressed many of the concerns of LDCs. 261 The NIEO encourages
economic independence of LDCs from industrial countries, develop-
ment of LDC economies through self-reliance, and the creation of insti-
tutions to manage resources from a global standpoint. 262 Moreover,
"the NIEO is concerned not only with obtaining a greater share of the
world's resources for developing countries, but also with a greater role
in the decision-making processes in international institutions. ' 263
The Fund serves several of the goals expressed in the New Interna-
tional Economic Order by encouraging more direct aid in the form of
technology as well as cash, and by giving LDCs more control over the
decisions concerning this aid in the form of program lending. First, dis-
bursements are made on a direct and concessional basis. They are not
tied to provisions of conditionality. Second, the supervision by the
Executive Committee makes the Fund largely an independent entity
with representation equally divided between LDCs and industrial states.
No one state has greater voting power than any other member.
Although funding decisions less than $500,000 will be made by the
World Bank, the controversial nature of the Fund may cause the World
Bank to exercise extreme caution in making all funding decisions, defer-
ring to the Executive Committe in questionable situations.264 Thus, the
Executive Committee should retain substantial control over the Fund.
Third, the Fund exemplifies program-type financing without the restric-
tions this finanacing generally carries. In developing country reports,
LDCs will analyze their total domestic costs of complying with the Mon-
treal Protocol, and they will have autonomy in developing a strategy for
compliance. Although funding will still be approved and disbursed on a
project basis, this approach is less fragmented than traditional lending
decisions. Thus the Fund represents a move-even if a small one-away
from traditional lending practices, and an adoption-even if a tentative
one-of many of the requests of LDCs for new lending institutions.
260. Project financing, practiced by the World Bank, requires that individual
projects be approved by the lender. Program financing, practiced by IMF, allows
LDCs themselves to determine the specific projects to be financed, under the frame-
work of a larger development program. Such financing is restricted by provisions of
conditionality, such as "austerity programs laid down ... as a prerequisite for
extending credit." BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 2, at 70. Without conditionality,
"the borrower is being given carte blanche to do what he likes with the money, and the
lender can have no assurance that the borrower will be in a position to service or
redeem the loan." Michael Stewart, Massive Transfers of Resources: Mechanisms and Insti-
tutions, in DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, supra note 253, at 122.
261. Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201 (S-VI) 6 Spec., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
262. Blakeney, supra note 23 1, at 695.
263. Nural Islam, Revolt of the Periphery, in TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEVELOP-
MENT 179 (Kim Q. Hill ed. 1979).
264. Interview with VijayJagannathan, Analyst, World Bank (Feb. 14, 1991).
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2. Political Precedence and Environmental Protection
The Fund is politically sensitive because it signifies a change in multilat-
eral financing mechanisms. Since its signing in 1987, the Montreal Pro-
tocol has been viewed as a structural model for other international
environmental treaties, most notably-and imminently-a treaty con-
cerning global climate change.2 65 The Fund may also become a model
for future financial mechanisms in effectuating such treaties. 26 6 The
precedential significance of the Fund is magnified by its break with tradi-
tional forms of assistance programs and institutions, such as the World
Bank and IMF.
The structure of the Fund threatens traditional methods of interna-
tional aid, which are based on principles of sovereignty. Donor states
traditionally maintain control over the money that they contribute so
that collectively they have proportionate control over disbursement
decisions. The principle of proportional voting, characteristic of the
World Bank and the IMF, preserves this notion of sovereignty. 267 The
Fund, however, upsets the relationship. For example, even though the
United States contributes $50 million, or twenty-five percent, it has only
one vote out of fourteen.
The United States at first objected to this new structure and now
seeks to limit its application in other contexts. Although the United
States completely rejected the concept of the Fund at first, it reversed its
position under political pressure. 2 68 The U.S. originally stated that "as
potentially the biggest donor to the Fund, it should have the biggest
share of the votes on the executive council that will administer the
money. It also want[ed] a permanent seat on the council as of right."'2 69
Once it conceded these positions, the United States delegation to the
Second Meeting specifically stated that "any financial mechanism set out
here does not prejudice any future arrangements the Parties may
265. See, e.g., Report of the Second Meeting, supra note 5, para. 18.
Stressing that far more than the ozone layer was at stake, [the Executive
Director of UNEP] said that a successful outcome would give a tremendous
boost to the forthcoming World Climate Conference and provide an impetus
for the conclusion of conventions on such other major issues as climate
change and biological diversity ....
Id.
266. During recent sessions of both the Intergovernmental Negotiating Commit-
tee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC-FCCC) (Sept. 9-20, 1991),
and the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological
Diversity (INC-CBD) (Sept. 23-Oct. 2, 1991), some delegations advocated the estab-
lishment of specific trust funds under each convention, and cited the Multilateral
Fund of the Protocol as precedent. Observation of the author while attending the
above sessions.
267. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
268. Peter Aldhous, Who Holds the Purse Strings?, 345 NATURE 757 (1990); see also
Ozone Depletion: Administration to Propose Fund to Help LDCs Control CFC Emissions, 14
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 460, 461 (June 22, 1990).
269. John Hunt, U.S. Clashes with Third World Over Ozone Fund, FIN. TIMEs, June 22,
1990, at 10.
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develop with respect to other environmental issues."'2 70
The actual $50 million share of the United States is trivial in rela-
tion to the significance of the possible precedent. If this fund were
duplicated for other environmental crises, such as global warming, the
contributions of the U.S. alone might climb into the billions of dol-
lars.27 1 As it is, funding for the Global Environment Facility is esti-
mated at $1.2 billion.2 72 The U.S. recently joined in a statement at the
Economic Summit that supported the Global Environment Facility. 2 73
However, during the third session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in
Nairobi from September 9-20, 1991, the U.S., along with Japan and the
EC, did not support the establishment of a climate-change fund, similar
to that for ozone depletion. Rather, they supported "the strengthen-
ing" of existing financial mechanisms, including the GEF, the World
Bank, and IMF. 2 74 Similarly, during the fourth negotiating session/sec-
ond session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, held in Nairobi from September 23-
October 2, 1991, the same countries favored the strengthening of
existing financial mechanisms over the creation of a "biological diversity
fund." 2 75
D. Economic Implications of the Fund
One of the Fund's primary goals is to enable LDCs to "leapfrog" the
CFC-stage of industry. While the parties maintain the conventional wis-
dom that this will require direct subsidies to LDCs, some question the
economic necessity of subsidies, and the actual costs that will be
incurred by LDCs. Answers lie in an analysis of the harm resulting from
ozone depletion, the activities of historical polluters, and the nature of
the regulatory measures enacted in the Montreal Protocol.
Classic economic analysis defines environmental resources as a
common good and pollution of these resources as economic "externali-
ties" that are not borne by the polluter, but by society as a whole. As a
result, these resources are overexploited. 276 In terms of ozone deple-
tion, the cost of damage caused by CFCs has not been borne by the CFC
270. U.S. Dep't of State, Statement of the U.S. Delegation Regarding the Financial
Mechanism (undated, unpublished statement) (on file with Cornell Int'l Law Journal).
271. One estimate of the total cost of global warming is $40 billion. The share of
the U.S. would be $14.14 billion, calculated by population and the "carbon-inten-
sity" of the country's economy. David Thomas, Tips for a Global Climate Treaty, FIN.
TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1990, at 14 (citing FLORENTIN KRAUSE ET AL., ENERGY POLICY IN THE
GREENHOUSE (1990)).
272. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
273. Economic Declaration of the G-7 London Summit, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (July 26,
1991) (available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaitd File).
274. Observation by the author while attending the Third Session of the INC-
FCCC. See supra note 266.
275. Observation by author while attending the Second Session of the INC-CBD.
See supra note 266.
276. See generally BRUNNEE, supra note 23, at 53-77.
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manufacturers or by the countries in which these manufacturers are
based. The countries that have purchased CFC products have also
benefitted since the cost of the product did not include the cost of ozone
depletion. Direct regulation provides one way to "internalize" the costs
of pollution. 2 77
By 1986, with regulation of ozone-depleting substances inevitable,
manufacturers had economic incentive to develop substitutes for CFCs
as quickly as possible in an effort to control the market. Individual man-
ufacturers internalized the cost of ozone depletion by committing them-
selves to the development of more expensive substitutes. These
manufacturers realized the potential economic gains in developing these
substitutes before their competitors. 2 78 For countries that had ratified
the Montreal Protocol, the market failure was corrected. 2 7
9
LDCs were not willing to sign the Protocol without additional
incentives, however, since they would be penalized by forgoing the
cheaper costs of producing CFCs. The Fund thus provides economic
incentive for LDCs to ratify the Montreal Protocol, and provides finan-
cial assistance to enterprises and consumers in LDCs that ratify the
Protocol.
1. Economic Incentive for LDCs
As of 1986, LDCs produced seven percent of the total worldwide CFCs,
and their total consumption was nine percent. 28 0 While these figures
are low, one study estimated the growth rate for LDC consumption and
production of CFCs at a 5.5 percent annual average.28 1 LDCs have the
277. Id. at 56.
278. See id. at 102-104.
279. UNEP, ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT (1989) (report of the Economic Assessment
Panel, established under Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
PANEL REPORT]. Indeed, the Economic Assessment Panel notes that technological
development is demand-driven, and that this demand has resulted in low-cost
substitutes:
The urgency of the need to reduce drastically CFC and halon use is certain to
speed up the development of high-productivity substitute technologies ....
The emergence of new, lower-cost alternatives to CFCs since the signing of
the Montreal Protocol supports this optimistic expectation. The technical
community now projects that half of the existing volume of CFC use can be
eliminated at no net cost.
Id. at 38.
280. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7000 Z, 543.7001 A. Total worldwide
production of CFC-11/12/113/114/115 equaled 1.080 million metric tons in 1986.
LDCs accounted for 75,000 metric tons. Total worldwide consumption totaled 1.005
million metric tons, while LDCs accounted for 90,000 metric tons. Id.
Another study estimates that CFC production in LDCs for 1989 is closer to
110,000 metric tons, with "India (24,000 tons), China (20,000 tons), and Brazil
(17,000 tons) as the major producers, closely followed by Argentina and Mexico
(10,000 tons each)." Consumption is estimated at 209,000 metric tons. FRIENDS OF
THE EARTH, supra note 89, at 9.
281. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7000, 543.7001 A. Other estimates for
consumption range from 7-10% annually, with certain countries like India predicted
to increase as much as 20%. As a result, LDCs may consume as much as 43.5% of
the world total CFCs or substitutes by 2008. FRIENDS oF THE EARTH, supra note 89, at
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capability to meet this increased demand by expanding their production
with their own technological foundation. 28 2 India currently produces
CFCs from several plants. 283 Its annual production is expected to rise
from 10,000 metric tons per year currently to 200,000 metric tons per
year in twenty-five years. 28 4 China reportedly has developed another
low-technology method of producing CFCs. 28 5 Given that LDCs can
produce CFCs without assistance from Western manufacturers, the
Fund provides the needed economic incentive for LDCs to ratify the
Protocol and refrain from production.
The provisions establishing a financial mechanism for the transfer
of technology were directed to two groups of LDCs: those which refused
to sign the Montreal Protocol in 1987, and those which had signed the
Protocol but were now concerned over the stricter control measures and
the heightened costs involved.28 6 In the former group were countries
like India and China, which refused to sacrifice any domestic develop-
ment without some commitment of external assistance.28 7 In the latter
group were countries already party to the Protocol, like Malaysia, which
remained committed to protecting the ozone layer, but felt that without
some type of financial mechanism and some provision for technology
transfer the Protocol would inhibit the country's economic
development. 2a8
The fact that India and China would not sign the Protocol until
there was a commitment of capital raises questions of "environmental
blackmail," or "green conditionality. '28 9 Many LDCs fear that the new
agendas at multilateral negotiations focus solely on global environmen-
tal problems affecting both industrial countries and LDCs, rather than
10. In contrast, absent regulation, the growth rate in industrial countries would be
2.5 percent. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7001 B.
282. Interview with VijayJagannathan, Analyst, World Bank (February 14, 1991).
283. Nicholas Schoon, Defiant Gandhi Confronts the West Over the Ozone Layer, THE
INDEPENDENT, June 30, 1990, at 2.
284. Technology Transfer Issue Hobbles World CFC Accord, CHEM. MKTG. REP., July 9,
1990, at 20.
As a comparison, CFC production in the U.S. was 513,000 metric tons in 1988.
BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7000 D.
285. Interview with Vijay Jagannathan, Analyst, World Bank (Feb. 14, 1991).
286. Ozone Sets Pattern fo" Greenhouse Diplomacy, FIN. TIMEs,July 16, 1990 (available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fintme File).
287. See Hearing on CFC Reduction: Technology Transfer to the Developing World, supra
note 163, at 88 (testimony of Liz Cook, Ozone Campaign Director of Friends of the
Earth). "[LDCs] voiced concern that they are being asked to abandon CFC-based
technologies without certainty that they will gain ownership of new technologies."
Id.
288. The Malaysian delegate to the Montreal Protocol, Datuk Amar Stephen K. T.
Yong, stated at the Second Meeting that the Protocol was "seen by some countries as
a pretext to place new obstacles in the way of efforts by developing countries to
develop their economies [and] to justify the adoption of regulations which constitute
obstacles to international trade." Ozone Sets Pattern for Greenhouse Diplomacy, supra note
286.
289. See Environment. Third World Fears a New Era of Green Conditionality, Inter Press
Service, Aug. 15, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File).
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problems specific to LDCs. 2 90 Furthermore, all funding for such
problems is currently directed through the Global Environment Facility,
which is limited to four discrete environmental problems. LDCs want
more flexibility in confronting general poverty and issues of develop-
ment, as well as purely environmental issues. 2 9 1
2. Financial Assistance for LDCs
Notwithstanding the future potential existing in LDCs, the technology
for production of ozone-depleting substances is currently controlled by
a handful of companies in the U.S., Europe, andJapan. 2 92 LDC capacity
to produce ozone-depleting chemicals at this point is largely restricted
through licenses issued by, and joint ventures with, these companies. 293
Given the oligopolistic nature of the CFC market, even more expensive
substitutes may not affect the profitability of the industry. Indeed, addi-
tional regulation could make the market even less competitive, and thus
more profitable for the producers. 294 As previously noted, regulation
spurred demand for new technologies, which has resulted in the devel-
opment of several substitutes that cost less than CFCs to produce. 29 5
Additionally, a Nordic study on reducing CFG consumption stated that
by 1996, a fifteen to twenty-five percent reduction from 1986 levels
would be possible with existing technology, obviating the need for addi-
tional research and development. 29 6
If monies from the Fund are used to subsidize the production of
ozone-safe chemicals in LDCs, and the producers are licensees and joint
ventures of transnationals, then the Fund will merely support the trans-
nationals themselves. Even if the producers are nationals of LDCs, they
will still reap a profit, albeit with greater overhead due to the incremen-
tal costs of alternative technologies. In essence, the Fund will be subsi-
dizing an already-profitable venture, regardless of who operates it.297
While CFC manufacturers may, in the long run, make no less profit,
and possibly more, with substitute substances and technologies, their
short-run costs, such as research and development and redesigning
components of products that use CFCs, have been significant. 2 98 These
290. Id.
291. Id. Ozone depletion, global warming, water pollution and biodiversity are
"concerns of developed countries, and there would be no effort to combat poverty as
a means of curbing environmental degradation, and the link between trade and envi-
ronment would be absent." Id. (paraphrasing a delegate from Algeria).
292. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 543.7001-543.7005.
293. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
294. ROAN, supra note 10, at 244.
295. See supra note 279.
296. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 279, at 42 (citing COWICoNSULT,
REDUCTION OF CFC-CONSUMPTION: TECHNICAL-ECONOMIc ASSESSMENT OF THE
OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CFC CONSUMPTION IN DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY AND SWE-
DEN, MAIN REPORT (1988)).
297. Interview with Professor Duane Chapman, Dep't of Agricultural Economics,
Cornell Univ. (Feb. 10, 1991).
298. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 279, at 103. For example, refrigerators
and air conditioners require new compressors for the new compounds.
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costs will not be borne by LDCs. Manufacturers and governments in
developed countries must invest in research and development in order
to preserve their business. Moreover, because LDCs generally buy fin-
ished products containing CFCs, they will not expend money in rede-
signing individual component parts. In the case of CFC substitute
technologies, LDCs therefore have an immediate advantage over devel-
oped countries.29 9 LDCs will also benefit in terms of technology trans-
fer because of the ten-year delay allowed under Article 5. During those
ten years, substitute technologies should develop, stabilize, and
decrease significantly in price.3 00
Given these circumstantial benefits to LDCs, the necessity of the
Fund for financial assistance to LDCs at first appears questionable.
These benefits will accrue to LDCs, however, only if they acquire new
technology after it has been fully developed and secured in developed
countries. As in the past, they would acquire technology on a limited,
proprietary basis, through either licenses or joint ventures. Private
enterprises in developed countries would retain the legal and financial
benefits from ownership of the new technologies.
LDCs have at this moment a significant opportunity to develop and
acquire new CFC-substitute technology concurrently with developed
countries.3 0 1 Indeed, lacking the historical dependence on CFCs, they
stand in a favorable position compared with industrial countries. 30 2
299. Id.
Countries that have not yet or only recently have begun to make investments
in CFCs need only observe the outcome of the research and development
efforts of the high-use CFC countries; they do not need to make these initial
investments of scarce resources themselves .... The opportunity to observe
this transition to non-CFC-using technology is thus of strategic importance to
developing countries considering investing scarce domestic savings or for-
eign exchange in CFC-dependent facilities.
Id.
300. See id. at 104.
[A)lI of these mitigations of the cost of adopting non-CFC technologies by
developing countries can occur regardless of the level of international finan-
cial assistance that is available to ease the transition. The existence of low- or
no-cost reduction opportunities, the shouldering of research and develop-
ment costs by high-use countries, the benefits of learning by doing, and the
unanticipated technical advantages of some CFC substitutes will become
more and more tangible over time. They represent a specific instance of the
general principle that for some new technologies, it is advantageous not to be
the first to adopt them.
Id.
30 1. See Guy D. Phillips, CFCs in the Developing Nations: A Major Economic Development
Opportunity. Will Institutions Help or Hinder?, 19 AMBIO 316, 317-18 (1990).
302. Developed countries must devote significant resources towards remedial
action, while LDCs can build a new non-CFC infrastructure; developed countries
must attempt to reduce emissions from existing sources, an endeavor of limited
potential, while LDCs can focus on preventing emissions from new sources, of
greater potential; developed countries must confront consumer habits in using CFCs,
while LDCs, without extensive consumption of CFCs, do not face this problem. Id. at
317.
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LDCs have the opportunity to begin on the same footing as developed
countries:
Because of the change in product technology, firms seeking to compete
internationally in markets for CFC-free products can start from essentially
the same point, if they have access to technology and expertise. New entrants in
the CFC-free market will not be competing against a refrigeration indus-
try in the industrialized countries with decades of optimization on CFC-
based ... designs behind it.30 3
Furthermore, with the entry into force of the Montreal Protocol, the
price of CFCs and CFC products has increased. 0 4 This rise in prices
makes the prolonged use of CFC products more expensive, and it
increases the opportunity costs of not switching to substitute technolo-
gies and substances. Indeed, expenditures made by LDCs now will ulti-
mately be outweighed by the economic gains made in the future;
investments by LDCs can eventually turn a profit.3 0 5
These benefits are available to LDCs, however, only if they have
access to CFC-free technology, as well as to capital and to expertise for
development of CFC-free technology. Bars to this access include the
lack of "resource bases, infrastructures, levels of general human capital,
and availability of trained scientific personnel." 3 0 6 If an LDC wishes to
enter into the CFC-free market, some of these barriers must be
removed. Most importantly, regardless of the long-term prospects of
investing in CFC-free technologies, LDCs lack the capital now necessary
for the investment. Without external financing, such as provided by the
Fund, they will not be able to take advantage of the opportunity that
would enable them to enter a profitable industry.
Furthermore, many LDCs may be unwilling or unable to invest in
their own technological base or to pay for additional licenses or joint
ventures in order to obtain CFC-free technology or products, despite
the immeasurable health and economic costs of depleting the ozone
layer. For many LDCs, the benefits of protecting the ozone layer are an
externality that they will experience minimally, just as the costs of
depleting the ozone layer were external to developed countries for
decades. The Fund, however, will allow LDCs to internalize the benefits
of protecting the ozone layer.
303. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 279, at 105 (emphasis added).
304. See DanielJ. Dudek et al., Cutting Cost of Environmental Policy: Lessons from Busi-
ness Response to CFC Regulation, 19 AMBIO 324, 325-26 (1990).
The prices of CFC- 11 and -12 increased from $0.61 and $0.71 per pound in
early 1989 to $0.80 and $0.90 per pound, respectively, by mid-1989. ByJan-
uary 1990 they had risen again to $0.90 and $1.04. EPA estimates that prices
may eventually rise as much as fivefold.
Id. at 326.
305. Interview with Professor Duane Chapman, Dep't of Agricultural Economics,
Cornell Univ. (Feb. 10, 1991). See also ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 279, at
109.
306. ECONOMIC PANEL REPORT, supra note 279, at 107.
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Conclusion
The financial provisions of the Montreal Protocol, in particular the
establishment of the Fund, represent a major step toward global envi-
ronmental protection and equitable economic development. The Multi-
lateral Fund provides an efficient means of capital reallocation for
defraying the costs facing LDCs in protecting the ozone layer. Even
where protective measures could be made at little or no cost, the estab-
lishment of the Fund provides the economic incentive for LDCs to ratify
the Montreal Protocol, thus making it an effective instrument for attain-
ing a worldwide ban on ozone-depleting substances. That the financial
commitment of industrial countries is tied to the legal commitment of
LDCs in complying with the Protocol furthers the twin goals of environ-
mental protection and economic development. The Fund utilizes
existing intergovernmental organizations in its administration, yet it has
established a new decision-making body in the Executive Committee, in
which both LDCs and developed countries have equal voice.
Notwithstanding these unique funding features, however, the Fund
may have a limited effect on the equitable transfer of technology. Thus
far, both public and private institutions have made significant efforts in
training personnel and disseminating information. Hard technology,
however, is currently being developed and will likely remain in the
hands of enterprises in developed countries, with limited access pro-
vided through joint ventures and licenses. The Multilateral Fund must
be used by developing countries to invest in ozone-safe technologies
now, in order to secure equal footing in a new field; otherwise, equitable
transfer of technology will occur only with systemic changes in the legal,
political and economic structures of society.
The value of the Fund as a prototype for future financial mecha-
nisms can be examined on two levels. As a form of capital reallocation,
it holds immeasurable potential. With conventions currently being
negotiated on the issues of climate change and biological diversity, it
offers a precedent that should be followed. The recognition that devel-
oped countries have benefitted from artificially low costs of develop-
ment due to environmental externalities, and the legal obligation-
regardless of actual liability-to compensate developing countries for
higher costs of development imposed by new environmental regula-
tions, are elements inherent in the existence of the Fund. As a mecha-
nism for equitable technology transfer, however, the Fund's
effectiveness is questionable. Before its potential can be realized, such a
mechanism must ensure that LDCs have an opportunity to invest in new
technologies as they are being developed.
The oligopolistic nature of the CFC industry has been a factor in
the expeditious development of substitute products and technologies.
The relatively small number of firms in the CFC industry have been able
to explore new avenues of cooperation without threatening their market
share. The cost of replacement substances and technologies is a dis-
creet figure that has been steadily decreasing, so that the necessary capi-
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tal has not been overwhelming. These elements do not exist in
confronting either the threat of climate change, which is inextricably
tied to societal dependence on fossil fuel and energy consumption, or
that of biological diversity, which involves the sensitive issues of biotech-
nology and intellectual property rights. Thus, it may be difficult to
achieve the success so far experienced by the financial mechanism of the
Montreal Protocol in other areas of the environmental protection.
As the first multilateral financial mechanism for protecting the envi-
ronment, the Multilateral Fund carries many implications for the legal,
political and economic systems of the global community. It establishes
an important precedent that cuts across international law and politics
and environmental law and economics. Regardless of its inherent
strengths and weaknesses, its greatest significance lies both in the recog-
nition and acceptance by industrialized countries that developmental
and environmental problems in LDCs are not only causally related but
globally relevant, and that such problems must be solved through new
legal, political and economic regimes of international cooperation.
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